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ABSTRACT
This thesis and its accompanying project are concerned with the use of digital
technology in the representation of material culture. The thesis aims to find
ways of using such technology that are appropriate to our present needs and
to its potential. The computer is a technology which we understand, interact
with and relate to through metaphor. I propose that many of the metaphors
through which we understand it invoke the idea of an enclosed space. The use
of such a trope might seem suitable when using computers for representing
museum collections, or material culture in general, since it invokes the
enclosed space of the museum. I examine how this idea of enclosure is mani-
fested in computer developments such as virtual reality and artificial intelli-
gence. I also look at how these developments are congruent with perspectival
modes of visual representation privileged in the modern era. I argue that such
metaphors and forms of representation, whether manifested in visual arts, the
museum, or computer applications are problematic, bound up as they are with
modern western ideas of mastery and transcendence, which are presently
being subjected to critiques from various quarters.
Throughout the modern era there have been forms of representation which
have contested the dominant visual mode of modernity. These include the art
of the Baroque in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, in this century,
the work of the Surrealists. In contrast to the rational, orthogonal space of
modernity, both these deal with complex and fragmented representations of
spaces and time. Such developments have been discussed as forms of repre-
sentation appropriate to contemporary concerns about knowledge They also
have a corollary in computing developments, such as multimedia and hyper-
media, Yet, I argue, those working in multimedia have in the main failed to
exploit the potential of such developments to enable new ways of representing
knowledge. I propose looking to both the Baroque and Surrealism to find pos-
sible models and strategies for use in multimedia in the representation of
material culture. In relation to this I describe practical work done in conjunc-
tion with this thesis which uses these models as the basis of a piece of multi-
media software for the representation of material culture.
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INTRODUCTION
Nature of this PhD submission
This PhD submission, consisting of a thesis, and an accompanying project, is
an example of a new genre of PhD submission, one which comprises of a piece
or pieces of creative work accompanied by a written exegesis. The emergence
of this kind of doctorate is predicated on the desire to enable creative work, as
undertaken in the arts, to be recognised as having the same academic status as
research in the sciences and the humanities. In theory this is, I believe, a rea-
sonable idea, but in practice it presents a number of problems. The processes
that enable creative work in, for example, the visual arts, design or music, are,
arguably, not always susceptible to being described in terms appropriate to a
doctoral submission. Such works often resist intellectualisation. This is not to
suggest that works of this sort are not the product of a critical intelligence, or
that they lack intellectual content, but rather that often the decisions which led
to their emergence cannot be described in rigorous and definitive terms. There
is also the problem of authorial voice. The neutral, academic, tone appropriate
to a PhD thesis is often not appropriate to descriptions of personal decisions
undertaken in the course of creative work. This neutral tone can often only be
made to serve such an end through the use of tortured syntax.
In the particular case of this thesis there is, because of the subject matter, the
nature of the practical work, and my approach to both, a large theoretical and
academic component. The problem then is of showing the relationship
between the theoretical and practical elements. This is not straightforward. In
undertaking the practical work I was not always conscious of its theoretical
underpinnings. Nor did I always have the practical work in mind when think-
ing through the theoretical aspects. Nevertheless they are closely related. The
best analogy I can think is a topological one. The design was underpinned and
2determined by theory without necessarily acknowledging or explicitly evinc-
ing it. This thesis is thus not intended to be just a description of the practical
work, nor is the practical work intended simply as an illustration of the writ-
ing. Taken as a whole it can be understood as the record of a kind of dialectic
in which practice and theory reflect upon, support and inform each other.
The Project
The PhD research was undertaken as part of a research studentship at
Middlesex University, intended to study 'the Virtual Museum: Applications of
Multimedia to Museums and Galleries.' It was understood that the researcher
would produce both a practical piece of work that engaged critically with an
aspect of the use of multimedia in relation to the museum, and a thesis which
reflected upon the relevant issues.
The practical work is the interface design for a piece of software developed at
Cambridge University, in the Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology and
the Department of the History and Philosophy of Science. Archaeology and
the History and Philosophy of Science are both areas in which actual artifacts
are used in teaching. To this end in most such departments there are collec-
tions of appropriate objects used for teaching. In actual teaching collections as
they exist in universities and university museums objects are often fragile and
rare and access is normally limited to those researching, studying or teaching
in the institution in which the collection is housed. Furthermore the constitu-
tion of the collection is often subject to the vagaries of curator's and donor's
choice of objects and the limitations set upon availability of such objects,
through the institution's own financial constraints and the mechanics of the
marketplace. Like all museum collections teaching collections are thus full of
shortcomings, anomalies and lacunae.
3A group composed of members from both the aforementioned areas at
Cambridge proposed to develop what they called the 'Virtual Teaching
Collection' by which they hoped to overcome at least some of the problems
described above. By amalgamating in digital form several different collections
in the same subject area more balanced and complete collections can be assem-
bled. By placing such virtual collections on easily transportable media such as
CD-rom many more people can have access to them. Obviously virtual collec-
tions do not offer the experience of being able to handle actual objects, but
through rich visual archiving, three dimensional imaging and so on such col-
lections can stand as a good substitute when the real thing is not available, as
well as offering access to larger sets of objects than found in a single collection.
Above all the main object of the project was not just the assembly of digital
archive material, but the development of sophisticated tools with which to
view and manipulate the collections, as well as to give access to links and
additional material.
Alongside these practical intentions the project was intended to explore more
theoretical ideas concerning the nature of museums and representation. Both
its immediate, practical aims of this project and the issues it wished to look at,
were allied to ideas I had been developing in my initial PhD research. Though
it had a specific concern with teaching collections I felt that it could usefully
become a platform from which to address broader issues concerning muse-
ums, digital technology and the representation of material culture.
The Thesis
This project is dealt with in detail in the last chapter of this thesis. In the previ-
ous chapters I describe what I see as the theoretical and cultural issues in the
relationship between digital technology and material culture. This is both a
theoretical exegesis and an account of the thought processes that underpinned
4the design of the project.
In the first chapter I argue that the computer, unlike other technologies, is
peculiarly and uniquely flexible of shape and use. Within the, very broad, limi-
tations of software and hardware, a computer can be almost any shape and
dedicated to almost any purpose. I suggest that this has meant that the shapes
and uses in which the computer is actually manifested thus bear a great deal
of cultural meaning. Such shapes and uses, relieved of the burden of physical
laws and utilitarian concerns can reflect desires and concerns of the surround-
ing culture with flexibility. With this is mind I treat computer technology as a
kind of text reflecting the culture out of which it emerges, and which can be
read and analysed in textual terms. In particular I explore how the computer is
conceived in terms of various metaphors, which are used to enable people to
understand it in terms of other technologies, institutions and devices, and also
to facilitate the conceiving of, and the designing of software. Many of the
metaphors used thus are concerned with ideas of interiority and separateness.
Similarly the shape the computer has assumed, in the last twenty years or so,
also reflects such notions. I suggest therefore that underlying the various ways
we approach and understand the computer is what I describe as a discourse of
interiority and separateness.
In the next chapter I look at the historical roots of such a discourse. I propose
that, with Ramus in the sixteenth century, a certain discourse of separateness is
initiated that continues with Descartes, Newton and Locke. This is manifested
in several different ways, including the closed systems of science and the tran-
scendent Cartesian ego. By tracing the development of the computer, at least
as a concept, back to the seventeenth century I show how it too was part of
this discourse. I show how this continues to be manifested in developments
such as artificial intelligence, virtual reality and cyberspace. I then discuss the
museum as another manifestation of this discourse, and how modern pre-
5sumptions about the spatial display are manifested in both it and Cyberspace.1
In the third chapter I look at the way many of the presumptions concerning
space, perspective and subjectivity, which underlie virtual reality and
Cyberspace and, arguably, the museum, have been questioned in the last hun-
dred or so years. I show how the computer itself, despite being a paradigmatic
rationalist machine, has also, since its inception, engaged in ways of under-
standing and representing knowledge which run counter to rationalist certain-
ties. In particular I look at non-linear forms of representation such as hyperme-
dia and multimedia, and how these relate to the present debates about knowl-
edge held under the aegis of postmodernity, particularly as argued in relation
to the museum. To find a solution to what I see as the shortcomings of work in
this area, I look to the strategies undertaken in relation to the museum by the
Surrealists, and the guest-curated shows in museums and galleries which cur-
rently use some of these strategies.
In the fourth chapter through the work of Walter Benjamin I connect the
Surrealist interest with museums with an ancestor of the museum, the curiosi-
ty cabinet. The cabinet is a site in which arrangements of objects can be seen to
represent structures of knowledge and thinking other than those taken for
granted. I also suggest that the cabinet in particular makes a useful model for
use in the representation of material culture in a postmodern era concerned
with problematics of knowledge and representation. Following this I argue
that much computer-generated graphics and design already manifest a
Baroque sensibility. Combining this idea with Benjamin's exploitation of alle-
gory and emblematics I propose the Baroque cabinet of curiosities as a model
for multimedia in the representation of material culture. It is this model which
forms the basis of the practical work describe in the last chapter.
Notes
1 I have defined what I mean by modernity in appendix 2
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Museums and Digital Technology
The relation between the museum and digital media constitutes the site of a
kind of forcefield. The power and presence of the museum exerts forces which
holds the discussion of digital media within certain limits. This is necessary,
since the definition of such media is often fluid and changeable, and resists
being pinned down. With the concept of digital media held in place, albeit
temporarily, by this forcefield, questions about culture, epistemology,
metaphor and so on can be posed and answered. An understanding of what
digital media is and might be can be gained through analysing how it differs
from the museum. At the same time this might produce a new understanding
of what a museum is and what it might be.
The Museum as an institution is expressive of certain ways of structuring
knowledge and is deeply implicated in concerns about knowledge and repre-
sentationl . It also, arguably, embodies notions of knowledge spaces and other
metaphorical spatial structures, which are much discussed in relation to virtual
reality and cyberspace. Computer technology would thus seem to have much
to offer museums. It is therefore not surprising that such institutions have been
quick to exploit computers, both as tools for research and as a way of present-
ing information to the public. There are several different ways in which com-
puter technology is presently being exploited in relation to the display of
material culture.2
Cataloguing represents the first use of computers in museums. This reflects the
computer's manifestation as a text, as opposed to a multimedia machine. In
one sense all the computer enabled was the transfer of the standard collec-
tions of 3" x 5" card files which, in general, had been how museums cata-
.
7logued their objects, into the computer. Despite being in a nonmaterial digital
format, rather than physically on paper, the records are ostensibly the same3.
Yet the computer enabled 'a totally new way of thinking about artifact
records'4. In a paper catalogue, the objects have to be listed under, and ordered
by one of the available domains. This could be by location, date, date of acces-
sion, location in the museum and so on, depending on the needs of the muse-
um. Those responsible for cataloguing have to make a decision according to
their needs. This decision will have an effect on how the material is under-
stood. Through digital means new ways of understanding the material can be
formulated. Cataloguing, a seemingly straightforward and even banal activity,
is an important issue in relation to epistemology and the 'order of things', and
other aspects of knowledge bought into question both by the uncertainties of
postmodernity5 and by the possibilities and changes afforded by new technol-
ogy. At one level the computer simply makes cataloguing and the searching of
catalogues much easier. But that ease brings with it both potentials and prob-
lems that, in effect, change our relation with the knowledge with which we
invest objects. This change in relations underlies, and is implicit in, many of
the claims made for digital technology, especially in relation to multimedia
and hypermedia.
The shift from using computers simply as cataloguing tools to using them as
media for the representation of knowledge about material culture is part of a
larger shift in how computers are marketed and used. The idea of the comput-
er as a visual medium initiated by Xerox and Apple in the nineteen seventies,
and the rise of the personal computer in the seventies and eighties, led to the
development of computer multimedia as a commercially-viable industry6 .
Since then there has been an explosion of multimedia development, not least
in the museum world. Large numbers of museums and galleries in this coun-
try and abroad have installed or intend to install interactive displays of one
sort or another. Some, such as the National Gallery's Micro Gallery, are intend-
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ed to introduce the user to the whole collection. Others, such as the Victoria
and Albert's 'Images of China's Past and Present' are situated in a specific
department, and are only relevant to that department's collection. Some
accompany temporary exhibitions, or constitute temporary exhibits in them-
selves, such as the Tate Liverpool's 'Sculpture Interactive' 7. Interesting and
innovative work has been done in the United States M using interactive tech-
nology in Holocaust museums.8
Museums and others have also started to produce commercial products devot-
ed to art and antiquities. Some of these derive from kiosk displays in muse-
ums. A good example of this is MicroSoft's Art Gallery, which is a CD version
of the National Gallery's Micro Gallery. Other museums, such as the Louvre
and the Smithsonian have produced or licensed interactive products, on CD-
rom and CDi respectively9. Production of such items outside of museums is
clearly complicated by issues of copyright, though there are products devoted
to fine art and material culture that are not centred on museums or galleries.
The Multimedia corporation is, for example, producing a number of CD-roms
devoted to the in-depth analysis of single works of art. Interestingly many of
the interactive encyclopaedias now being produced exploit the metaphor of
the museum for their interfacelo.
Another place in which museums are beginning to take an interest is the
World Wide Web on the Internetn . Though at the moment hampered by poor
interfaces, inadequate interactivity and slowness the Web has been and contin-
ues to be a fertile environment for the exploration of ideas and concepts12.
Relieved of the burden of commercial considerations sites on the Web can be
far more experimental than products such as CD-rom. A large number of sites
have been set up concerned with the representation of visual material. Some
originate from museums, galleries or universities. Some are virtual galleries of
material culled from other places. Others are devoted to virtual art. Sites pro-
9liferate and disappear with comparative rapidity.13
One type of production, whose commercial exploitation is hampered by tech-
nological constraints, but would seem an obvious use of the technology in this
area is virtual reality14 . The 'virtual museum' where the user is afforded the
sensation of moving through a physical space would seem a natural applica-
tion of computer technology to museums and galleries. One of the most
famous of such displays is the Virtual Pompeii display at San Francisco's H. M.
de Young Museum15 . As a research project Apple Computers produced their
'Virtual Museum' in which the user could manoeuvre around a computer-gen-
erated space to look at objects. The computer artist Jeffrey Shaw has also made
some interactive pieces based on the idea of the gallery. More recently Apple
have developed software to create photographic-based, as opposed to comput-
er-generated, kinds of virtual environments16.
As is evident from this brief account digital technology has something to offer
in a purely practical sense to institutions and individuals in the business of
ordering, cataloguing and displaying objects. But the degree to which, and the
manner in which such institutions and individuals have embraced this tech-
nology suggests that something more complex is going on. I suggest that there
are a number of congruences, and perhaps even a kind of isomorphism
between the computer and the museum, that may explain the enthusiastic
exploitation of computer technology by people involved in such institutions.
The Computer as Text
In order to explore this idea we need a way of approaching the computer other
than purely in terms of technology. In order to consider it out of this context I
take a semiotic approach, in which the computer is a sign within a system of
signification, defined by its relation to and difference from other signs, rather
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than simply a piece of technology. In fact, because of the complex set of mean-
ings accruing to the computer I treat it as a kind of text which can communi-
cate many meanings. Such an approach is heralded by the German critic and
philosopher Walter Benjamin.
Every expression of human mental life can be understood as a kind of
language, and this understanding, in the manner of a true method,
everywhere raises new questions: It is possible to talk about a language
of music and of sculpture, about a language of justice that has nothing
directly to do with those in which German or English legal judgments
are couched, about a language of technology that is not the specialized
language of technicians. Language in such contexts means the tendency
inherent in the subjects concerned-technology, art, justice, or religion-
toward the communication of mental meanings.17
This approach is similar to that of Michel Foucault who uses a linguistic model
to analyse the discourses in which phenomena, such as circumstances, events,
objects and machines are manifested. To this end he devised a theory of 'dis-
cursive formations', which treated such phenomena as statements within a
field of discourse18. These involved four basic elements which define how such
entities are understood and manifested in specific cultural circumstances; the
objects statements are about; the authority such statements have; the concepts
through which they are formulated; and the themes they develop. 19 Following
Foucault the Australian sociologist Stephen Hill has discussed at length the
idea of technology as text.
Unless we know what the machines are for, and how to use them, they
remain as rusting and inconvenient pieces of matter that we must nego-
tiate our way around in everyday life - in the same way that we avoid
junkyards and derelict buildings. The tool or the machine in this sense
embodies a cultural text that is set within the grammar of the back-
ground system, but remains unreadable in everyday life unless we
know the action-and-meaning cypher.20
The idea of technology as text is, I believe, particularly apt for the computer.
Most technologies conceal their textual nature behind the solidity of their
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appearance, and the fixity of their purpose. Though they are enunciated out of
the 'grammar of the background system', their status as enunciation, as text, is
occluded. To begin with, though, new machines reveal their textual nature by
being understood in terms of previous technologies and models. In other
words they are understood metaphorically21.
Fisher (1991), following Kubler (1962) employs the linguistic term 'drift', origi-
nally defined by Sapir (1921)22, to discuss how we use such models and
metaphors to deal with novel states of affairs or objects. Fisher points out that
these are usually dealt with by being placed in an existing sequence. He gives
as an example the word 'airport', which deals with the existence of a place
from and to which people fly. By use of the suffix 'port' the airport is being
understood in terms of the seaport. Thus it is placed in a sequence of ideas
that include portable, portage, porter, port, seaport and airport. By being
locked into a historical sequence some control over its novelty is secured. The
use of the suffix port in the case of airport is, to begin with,, metaphoric. But as
the term airport becomes transparent, that is as its anchoring to the seaport
metaphor is forgotten it allows 'port' to drift away from its attachment to the
shipping and the sea.23
Some objects are harder to place into such sequences. One way to do so is to
assign it a name that places it in a sequence negatively, for instance 'wireless',
which places a new technology in a sequence of wired communications tech-
nology - telegraph, telephone - by pointing out that it does not need wires. A
similar point can be made about the term 'horseless carriage'. In both these
cases the sequence in which the objects thus named had been placed were
soon seen to be inadequate or irrelevant, and they were assigned new names,
'radio', 'car', 'bus'24 . For most objects being described and metaphorised by
being placed in a sequence with other objects is not problematic. With simple
problem-solving devices - drinking vessels, bridges - their essence remains the
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same, however much materials and techniques of construction develop.
Others, such as cars, radios, telephones, either meet more efficiently a need
previously catered for by other means, for example transportation, or develop
a new purpose by which they are consequently defined.25
The computer presents a different set of problems. This is because of its unique
ontology as a technology. The only possible description of what a computer is
is a place where computing takes place. Computing itself can best be defined
as a process where data is entered into a device, whereupon the device can
store it, manipulate it, store or output the result of the manipulation. Anything
that does this is a computer. 26 Obviously what we mean, at least at the
moment, by a computer is a device that is almost certainly electronic, and most
probably digital and binary. Nevertheless failing to be one or all of these
would not stop it being a computer, as long as it fulfilled the necessary func-
tions of computing. This is, I argue, very different to other modern technolo-
gies. In one sense a car is just a machine that transports people from a to b. But
so is a bus, or a van, or a golf cart. Certain physical factors determine whether
a people-transporting vehicle is a car, as opposed to any other sort. Unlike the
car the computer can be any shape possible within the actual limitations of the
technology.
Thus one might say 'The Computer does not exist'. Computers clearly exist.
What does not exist is any kind of platonic form of 'The Computer'. It can be
and is manifested in any number of physical forms, from small elements in
washing machines, parking meters and so on, through to massive parallel-pro-
cessing supercomputers. Indeed as the computer becomes ever more part of
our lives it disappears into other objects. 27 But there is a paradoxical corollary
to this. Whatever shape computers appear in they are physical objects.
Computing is a physical process, however it might appear otherwise.
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It is in the concatenation of these two facts that the computer's peculiar ontol-
ogy resides, and thus its particular relationship with metaphor. It has to take
on a physical form, but, within very broad limitations, that can be almost any
form possible. Thus it can only ever be temporarily or contingently anchored
to a particular sequence of previous technological phenomena. This means that
a secure identity can never be secured for it that would allow it, as in the case
of a car or a radio, to escape the necessity of being defined and understood
through metaphor. What this suggests is that the form it does take says a great
deal more about the needs of the culture in which it is produced than it does
about the technology itself. Each configuration of physical elements that comes
to mean 'the computer' at any one time can express immediately and vigor-
ously ideas of the surrounding culture. The actual technology is now so com-
pact that there are practically no physical constraints to the computer's shape
or size. But, this notwithstanding, a particular shape or configuration of shapes
comes to mean 'the computer' at any particular time. Twenty years ago 'the
computer' might have invoked images of sterile white rooms full of cupboard-
sized boxes filled with
whirring tapes (figure 1).
Now it is more likely to
suggest a personal com-
puter, whose combination
of TV-style monitor, key-
board (and possibly
mouse) and box contain-
ing the actual workings,
has become the visual	 Figure 1. A 1960s computer setup
metonym of the technology.
Throughout its history the computer has gone through some extraordinary
changes of shape, size and use. From the room-sized, valve-driven computers
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of the nineteen forties and fifties to the personal computers, laptops and palm-
tops of today is an astonishing line of development (figure 2)28 . In the begin-
ning the design of the computer was
entirely predicated on the crude necessi-
ties of the technology It had to be vast,
since it operated through the use of
large numbers of valves. The inconve-
nience associated with using the com-
puter in the ways necessitated by its
Figure 2. An Apple Newton Palmtop
design lead to attempts to find new
ways. These were often derived from metaphors based on other technology,
such as displays derived from the idea of radar to allow information to be
visualised, or input devices taken from typewriters to enable greater ease of
data input. The exploitation in turn enabled new perceptions of the technolo-
gy. The exploitation of radar technology for example enabled the idea of the
computer to shift from being just a 'number cruncher' to being a visual instru-
ment and medium29. To take another analogy from linguistics the computer is
an example of a parole from the langue of contemporary technology It is a
parole composed of quotations30 . Thus, arguably, the shape the computer takes
reveals much about the culture which produces it. As a text it can be read to
reveal cultural needs and desires. Examining the different forms the computer
has taken through its history will reveal not just the aforementioned needs and
desires, but also the way the computer as a text came to be enunciated in the
way it now is. Though, as demonstrated by Fisher and others, all new technol-
ogy is understood through metaphors derived from previous models, the com-
puter is unique, because of its fluid nature and lack of fixity, in the degree to
which it is continuously defined through metaphor. Richard Coyne writes.
We can fashion whatever we want out of the computer—a desktop, a fil-
ing cabinet, a stage play—much as we can make almost anything out of
words. In other design areas, such as architecture or mechanical engi-
neering, the designer feels more constrained by tools, techniques, mate-
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rials, and a physical setting. It seems that principle and method assume
greater importance. By way of contrast, the medium of the computer-
software designer is pure, malleable strings of electrical impulses, sub-
ject to laws, but waiting to be fashioned through whatever metaphors
we desire.31
Metaphor is important in all aspects of computers. As Coyne also points out.
The structures of the operating system and other computer programs
and subroutines are commonly designed as a network of (invisible)
objects. These objects have properties, generate and receive "events,"
and send "messages" to one another. They take on meanings of the soft-
ware designer's own choosing, ranging from the abstract (such as the
algebraic variable x) to the more concrete, though bizarre, "demons" or
"autonomous agents" that monitor what is going on in the computer
system and act in response to some problem. Computer hardware can
also be considered in metaphorical terms. Many electronic components
are named after familiar entities: memory, gate, chip, processor, and so
on. In these senses, the entire computer system is imbued with
metaphor, from the structure and configuration of hardware to icons
and designation of objectlike names attached to program subroutines.32
One of the original metaphors for the computer, and possibly the most power-
ful, was that of the giant brain. Its force derived from the emergence of the
computer at a certain time and within a certain cultural context. The building
of the first actual computers came at more or less the same time as two highly
influential theories were expounded, Claude Shannon's Information Theory in
194833 and Norbert Weiner's Cybernetics 34 in the same year. The former was
concerned with the most efficient way of sending information electronically,
through wires or through the air. His work particularly concerned the notions
of entropy and redundancy in conveying information, and how they can best
be circumvented. Weiner's work was to do with the idea of self-regulating sys-
tems and their attempt to achieve equilibrium.
Weiner's definition of a system encompassed the electrical, chemical, mechani-
cal, biological, even the economic. Information theory was one of the comple-
mentary sets of ideas that made up cybernetics. Cybernetics, though highly
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technical as an idea seized the public imagination 'as a magic key which
would unlock the secrets of what had happened to the world in the past
decade.'35 It is easy to see how attractive such ideas might be to those work-
ing with the computer. Indeed the new technology seemed to be paradigmatic
of Weiner's notion of self-regulating systems, so much so that the term cyber-
netics was, at one point, almost synonymous with that of computing. Weiner
knew and admired Alan Turing, the mathematician whose 1936 paper 'On
Computable Numbers, with Application to the Entscheidungsproblem' 36 pre-
sented one of the first models of the modern computer, and acknowledged his
help in the introduction to his book on cybernetics. It was within this climate
that in 1950, having seen the theoretical machine he described in 1936 become
reality, Turing proposed that such machines might eventually manifest human-
like intelligence. This view appeared in a paper entitled 'Computing
Machinery and Intelligence' 37 published in the journal Mind. In it he envis-
aged a game in which an interrogator would have to guess which of two other
players was a man and which a woman entirely from written replies to ques-
tions he posed. The man's role was to fool and the woman's to try and con-
vince the interrogator. He then suggested a version, played through teletype
terminals, in which a machine was one of the players, which would be pro-
grammed to convince the interrogator that it was human. Turing postulated
that if it succeeded it would be for all intents and purposes intelligent and, fur-
thermore, conscious.38
Out of this idea of Turing, as well as Weiner's concept of cybernetics and other
contemporary thinking, came the branch of computing known as Artificial
Intelligence. The idea was to create programs which would encapsulate facts
about the world in the language of logic, and rules concerning those facts and
how to respond to them. If programmed in sufficient depth and with sufficient
complexity a machine would start to evince intelligence. 39
 There were initial
successes, that seem to bode well, but more ambitious projects almost always
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failed. In a way that may seem over ambitious now, at least to some, expo-
nents of Al confidently expected to have produced a computer that evidently
possessed intelligence and consciousness, at least by the end of the century.40
In a later chapter I will discuss what I see as the epistemological framework
that allows the operations of the mind to be thus understood. What is interest-
ing here is . the relationship between AT and metaphor. Weiner's Cybernetics
and Shannon's Information Theory existed in a certain framework of technolo-
gy and culture. The concepts which underpin both ideas, such as entropy, had
been discussed and theorised in the last century by people such as Sadi
Carnot, Rudolf Clausius and Claude Boltzmann. 41 But they had done so in
terms of heat and energy, thus using the models available from mechanical
industry. Shannon and Weiner's ideas are similarly predicated on models of
communication and information. Arguably such models dictate how phenom-
ena are understood and characterised42. Weiner's theories allowed a wide
range of phenomena to be understood in a certain metaphorical framework.
Among these is how we understand the workings of the mind. In the context
of such thinking the computer appears such an obvious model for the mind
that its metaphoric aspect is forgotten. It becomes a 'paraphor', a metaphor
whose metaphoricity is occluded or forgotten43. Thus the metaphorical state-
ment 'the mind is like a computer' gets elided into the statement 'the mind is a
computer'. In a very limited sense it might be a useful idea to understand the
brain as a computer, as long as one remains aware that this is a metaphor.
Whether AT is realisable or not it lead to the first metaphorising of the comput-
er. If the mind is a computer, then the computer is a mind."
It was so persuasive that it could be argued that its metaphoric status was for-
gotten. The computer was understood as a brain, not just similar in some
respects to a human's, but capable of evincing intelligence equal or greater
than a human's, and even manifesting consciousness. The science dedicated to
18
this notion, artificial intelligence (Al) has not, I would argue, succeeded in
achieving this aim, at least yet. What has happened is that withthe failure of
All to deliver what it originally promised, and the transformation of the com-
puter into a different sort of machine, new metaphors have been imposed.
Over the last twenty years the computer has metamorphosed from a vast and
mysterious device, to which access was restricted and difficult, to a small
'user-friendly' device for use in the office or home. Accompanying this change
has been a number of developments in how the computer was used and what
it was to be used for. Most important perhaps was the emphasis by people
such as Apple's Stephen Jobs, following the lead of Englebart and Kay and the
scientists at XeroxPARC, on the idea of the personal computer as a visual
device. The Alto, the computer designed at XeroxPARC, which became the
basis of the Apple Macintosh, had a 'bit-mapped' graphic display. This is
where the computer has in its memory a record of the state of every single
pixel, the mosaic elements out of which the computer's display is constructed.
This meant that what the Alto could display was not limited to crudely-
realised lines of text, as with most personal computers, but could display com-
plex graphics. With this innovation the computer became in effect a visual
machine, no longer a kind of brain, but a surface upon which marks could be
inscribed. This alteration of how the computer was perceived through
metaphor had important implications in how it was used and understood.
Stephen Levy, in his account of the Macintosh Computer describes the concep-
tion through metaphor of one of the most important tools in personal comput-
ing.
Metaphor, it turns out, is the key to making computers comprehensible.
It was not until the late 1970s when two Harvard Business School stu-
dents named Dan Bricklin and Bob Frankston used a metaphor easily
accessible to people who worked with money-accountants, economists,
bookkeepers, and anyone who ever wrote a business plan-that personal
computers crossed the line from a hobbyist obsession to a compelling
tool. The metaphor was that of a spreadsheet-the grid of rows and
columns of figures by which one calculated profit and loss. Their elec-
tronic spreadsheet was called VisiCalc, and it had many advantages
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over its paper counterpart, not the least of which was that it liberated
users from tediously having to recalculate the entire spreadsheet to
reflect changes caused by changing a single number. This freedom
allowed people to experiment without penalty; and actually changed
the perception of a spreadsheet from a document of hard costs into a
modelling tool by which one tested business scenarios. The software
metaphor was not only superior to the real thing. . . it became the real
thing. Now, when people speak of spreadsheets, they do not refer to the
green graph paper where spreadsheets used to live-those are useless
now. Spreadsheets are tools on a computer.45
VisiCalc's spreadsheet was possible with the conception of the computer as a
visual tool or space. To those working within the paradigm of the computer as
a giant brain, or similar metaphors, such a development I suggest would be
impossible. As important as VisiCalc was to the success of personal computers,
in particular the Macintosh, was desktop publishing. This is the technique that
allows somebody to design and 'paste up' paper publications while sitting at a
computer. Its introduction into the world of newspaper-, magazine- and book-
publishing has made a large number of different skills, such as type-setting,
redundant. It is, like VisiCalc, derived from the idea of the computer as a visu-
al tool, and from the metaphors that enables.46
The idea of the computer as a surface upon which to inscribe marks has
changed not only the kind of software available but the way the computer has
been characterised. No longer a brain, it has become understood instead in
terms of a book, a theatre or similar medium of expression. This metaphor has
gained particular force with the rise and increasing popularity of interactive
multimedia. It has found expression in theoretical exegeses (Bolter, 1991,
Landow, 1992). It also resonates with the current interest in the transformative
effect of information technologies, in which the computer can be seen as part
of the third great communications revolution, following literacy and printing
(Ong, 1982, McLuhan, 1965). A good example of both these ideas is found in
this quote from Landow.
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Over the centuries scribes, scholars, publishers and other makers of
books have invented a range of devices to increase the speed of what
today we call information processing and information retrieval.
Manuscript culture gradually saw the invention of individual pages,
chapters, paragraphing, and spaces between words. The technology of
the book found enhancement by pagination, indices, and bibliographies.
Such devices have made scholarship possible, if not always easy or con-
venient to carry out... Electronic text processing marks the next major
shift in information technology after the development of the printed
book. It promises (or threatens) to produce effects on our culture, partic-
ularly on our education, criticism, and scholarship, just as radical as
those produced by Gutenberg's movable type.47
There are a number of problems with this passage. Not least is the fact that it
evinces a problematic belief in an uncomplicated idea of progress. Landow
subsumes the book under the category of information technology, thus in
effect describing the book as a kind of proto-computer in order to ease the
introduction of the computer as book metaphor. This exemplifies Kubler and
Fisher's idea of sequence, albeit in a retrospective way. The book is placed in a
sequence, that of information technology, which culminates in the computer.
This metaphor is interesting, and problematic, inasmuch as it operates to a
large extent negatively. Landow and others compare the computer to the book
to the book's detriment. The computer enables ways of accessing information
not possible with print technology. These include non-linear access, hypertext,
the exploitation of moving images, sound etc... Above all there is the idea of
infinite amounts of information, open, linked and cross-referenced accessible
through the computer, made possible by the Internet. It is this lack of closure
that most excites theorists of digital media. Yet at the moment the most popu-
lar way to 'publish' for the computer is on closed, portable media such as CD-
rom. As a physical object the CD-rom can be treated as a commodity, and sold
like a book.
Another interesting, though less widely used metaphor, is that of the computer
as theatre. Its main exponent is Brenda Laurel, a theorist of interactive media
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who argues for it in her book 'Computers as Theatre' (1991). She compares the
kind of interactions people undertake with computers, and the expectations
these generate, to the experience of drama and the theatre. What is worth not-
ing for the purposes of this thesis is the direct comparison between the experi-
ence of using a computer and watching a play in a proscenium arch theatre.
This is because in such a theatre, as in a computer 'the technical magic that
supports the representation... is behind the scenes.' She also says that
Its not just that the technical underpinnings of theatrical performance
are unimportant to audience members; when a play is "working" audi-
ence members are simply not aware of the technical aspects at all. For
the audience member who is engaged by and involved in the play, the
action on stage is all there is... In this sense, plays are like movies. When
you are engrossed in one, you forget about the projector, and you may
even lose awareness of your own body. 48
It is interesting to note immediately how this understanding of the theatrical
experience is at odds with much of modern thinking in that area, particularly
for example in the work of Bertolt Brecht. Brecht's aim was to expose the
workings of the theatre in order make manifest the rhetorical character of
drama, and to shock the audience out of exactly the kind of forgetting Laurel
alludes to. This passage suggests that Laurel adheres to an understanding of
media and representation in which the mechanics of signification are invisible,
and that for her such ideas are not problematic.
The objects I have described through which the computer is metaphorised, the
brain, the book and the theatre, all invoke notions of interiority and exteriority,
openness and closure, separateness and conjoinedness. These notions are
found not just in the metaphors with which we understand the computer but
in its metonymic aspects as wel149 .
As a text the computer can be analysed in terms both of metaphor and
metonymy. Along the metaphoric line lie the metaphors through which the
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computer is understood, the brain, the book, the theatre and so on. Along the
metonymic line lie the contiguous associations with the computer as an object
or process, such as the box housing the
computer itself, the monitor, the keyboard,
the process of digital calculation itself.
The typical personal computer is usually
made up of three main components, a
screen, a keyboard, often used in conjunc-
tion with a mouse, and a container housing Figure 3. A typical modern PC setup
the actual computer (figure 3). To the lay user the functioning of this last is
concealed. Little is revealed by opening it up. It has no moving parts, nor is
there much indication of what it actually does. Nevertheless it is where the
actual computing takes place. The box contains binary data stored as configu-
rations on the surface of a magnetic disc; copies are made of this data in a
place where it can be operated on rapidly and the data is manipulated and
transformed by the central processor. The changed data is stored back onto the
original disc. As long as it works the computer can be understood as a kind of
black box, the engineering term for a component which is known to do what it
is supposed to do, so its internal workings are of no concern. Thus a user, one
would imagine, is aware only of their interaction with the screen and the key-
board, with the box's mediation between these two devices being effaced.
The other elements, the keyboard, the screen and so on, are there to turn
human input into the computer language of binary, and output that binary as
writing, sound, imagery or whatever. All the user's interactions take place
between these elements, the keyboard, or other input device, and the monitor,
or other output device. The box sits between these other devices, mediating
their connection and relation, without, apparently, making its presence known
in the process of computing.
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• Though the user can have no unmediated access to the operations in the box,
they are aware of it. Its presence makes itself felt through the other devices,
and through the various forms of interaction with those devices. The idea of
the box and of interior space manifest themselves throughout the gestures,
interactions and interfaces, the praxis, through which we act with the comput-
er.50 When the user sits at the computer I would argue that he or she is given
the sensation of looking into a space, rather than, as in the case of television, at
a screen.51 This may seem paradoxical, considering what the TV usually
shows is moving images of reality, which might seem more conducive of the
illusion of space. But I would argue that the fact that the user can manipulate
objects on the screen, whether that means making text appear or disappear in
the simpler kind of interfaces, or manipulating cursors and windows, tends to
deny the sense of the screen being flat. This creates an entirely different rela-
tionship between user/viewer and screen than with TV. The TV viewer sits at
some distance from the monitor and more or less passively watching the
screen. This passivity, and the apparently unmediated realism of what it
shows, means the viewer experiences the screen as having no relation to the
rest of the TV behind. The computer user on the other is knowingly interacting
with the machine,
Thus it could be argued that the computer has two kinds of interior space; the
literal space filled with the various electronic devices mentioned above, which
is obviously 'real', and yet which we do not usually see, interact with or
understand, and a virtual space which in most senses does not exist, and yet is
phenomenologically more real for us. This space is a metaphoric representa-
tion of the magnetic configuration of the media within the computer. Even
with command line systems like MS DOS 52, which might appear transparent
and unmediated, it remains highly metaphoric. In all systems, from text-based
command line to highly graphic representations the metaphor is spatial. In the
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operating system used by the VAX computer53 , for example, as the user is
given the sense of moving in and out of spaces where files are stored, even
though all interac-
tion is through typ-
ing text commands.
The kind of interface
most widely used
now is explicitly
spatial. Known as
graphical user inter-
faces (GUIs) (figure
Figure 4. The Apple GUI
4), they were devel-
oped by researchers at Xerox's Palo Alto Research Centre in the nineteen sev-
enties, following on from the work of Douglas Englebart in the previous
decade. In the Apple Interface for example any storage medium, the comput-
er's hard disk for example, is represented as an icon, a small image or symbol,
on the screen. By double-clicking on the icon the user can 'open' up the disk,
or whatever, to see what is inside it. In it there may be applications or files,
represented by different icons, or folders, which can also be opened up to
reveal their contents. Thus the sense of spatiality, closure and 'boxiness' is
made explicit.
This notion of spatiality is also found in much computer software. Many
games for example are set in enclosed spaces. A good example is a game called
Doom, in which the player is required to negotiate his or her way through a
threatening environment of passages and rooms while being attacked by vari-
ous enemies. Less threatening are virtual environments such as Cosmic Osmo
and Myst which the user can explore (figure 5). The genesis of these games
and environments, and indeed of much of the whole games industry, can be
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traced back to the MUDS or
'multi-user-dungeons',
which were text-based
games, played across uni-
versity networks in the
States, in which players
had to negotiate their way
through various landscapes
and interiorsm.
k..vq<
Figure 5. Screenshot from Myst
There are a number of more fundamental ways in which the computer can be
said to manifest ideas of interiority and separateness. For example it is a digi-
tal machine. This means that it manipulates and stores data in discrete ele-
ments and discontinuous scales. 55
 The computer furthermore is not just a digi-
tal, but a binary, digital machine. This means that all data is represented by
strings of information units in one of only two states. These states could be
thought of as on/off; black/white; yes/no. The obvious reason why computers
are binary is that in the beginning of computing it assured reliability; if a cir-
cuit need only be read as either high or low it has a greater margin of error
and less chance of being read inaccurately. As a binary digital machine the
computer embodies the tendency to understand the world in terms of discrete
entities and binary oppositions, initiated by Plato,56
 and which has since been
one of the presiding characteristics of western epistemology. For example
Boolean logic, the system devised by George Boole in the first half of the nine-
teenth century, which has become the basis of binary computer logic, classes
are determined in terms of 'P or not P', i.e. in terms of ex- or in-clusion within
a definition. Lakoff suggests that our experience of being embodied selves is
the basis of our grasp of such logic. As Lakoff puts its 'Everything is either
inside a container or out of it.'57
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Conclusion
What I have suggested so far is that the computer, as a physical object, through
the metaphors with which we understand and characterise it, through the
metonymies associated with its shape, through the interfaces and software that
are designed for it and through the fundamental symbolism of digital and
binary logic, is bound up with ideas of containing, boundaries, space and sep-
aration. I suggest that these different ways of understanding and characteris-
ing the computer can be subsumed under a single trope or figure, that of the
box. The box can perhaps be characterised in this context as a metametaphor, a
metaphor which encompasses all the other metaphors. In the following chap-
ters I use this figure of the box as, to mix my metaphors, a prism or lense
through which to focus on the various issues which are the concern of this the-
sis.
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1 Hooper-Greenhill (1992) in particular has undertaken a foucauldian analysis of how the way that
museums structure and represent knowledge is bound up with questions of power and epistemology
2 For overviews of the idea of the Virtual Museum see Museum News November /December 1994
3 Chenhall and Vance, 1988, p 10
4 Chenhall and Vance, 1988, p 13
5 This is discussed by Hooper-Greenhill (1992) and Walsh (1992). See also appendix 2 for my under-
standing of modernity and postmodernity
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tion in a variety of ways; text; graphics; video; animation; sound and so on, as well as the ability to make
multiple links between discrete portions of information. Above all it is interactive, meaning that the user
is enabled to take decisions about how, to what extent, and in what order, the information is accessed
and presented. It is one of a number of related developments in computing as a medium for representa-
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caust victim. By entering this number in various work stations around the museum the visitor can dis-
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museum see Weinberg and Elieli (1995)
9 CD-rom (Compact Disc Read Only Memory) and CDi (Compact Disc interactive) are based on the
same technology as the audio CD, and are formats for storing comparatively large amounts of data on
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cannot be written to.
10 Again see Cotton and Oliver (1993).
11 The Internet is the worldwide system of connected computers, through which people can communi-
cate through electronic mail, or publish material by setting up 'sites' on the 'World-wide Web'. These are
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Poetics and the Rhetoric. It was one of the parts used in rhetoric, the art of speaking. Aristotle, like Plato
before him, found rhetoric problematic (Ricoeur, 1978, p 11). He placed rhetoric both in opposition to phi-
losophy, and bound up with it, 'rhetoric is philosophy's oldest enemy and its oldest ally' (Ricoeur, 1978 p
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in which that truth is expressed. This distrust of metaphor pervaded much philosophical thinking until
recently. Only in the second half of the nineteenth century did metaphor begin to be appreciated not
simply as special poetic form of language, but the basis of language itself.
22 Fisher, 1991, p 100
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24 Fisher, 1991, p 106
25 Fisher, 1991, p 106 - 7
26 Until comparatively recently the principle definition of a computer was a person who engaged in
computing. A machine undertaking the same task was differentiated by an adjective such as electronic or
digital.
27 At the moment much effort is being taken to combine the computer with the TV to produce a kind of
hybrid device.
28 For an account of the development of the computer, see Palfreman and Swade (1991)
29 Palfreman and Swade (1991)
30 These terms are taken from the linguistic theories of Fernand de Saussure, who divided language into
three parts; langage meaning the entire field of linguistic activity; langue meaning a language system such
as English or German, with its particular vocabulary, grammar, principles of construction; and parole
meaning a specific utterance within a such a structure.
31 Coyne, 1995, p 250
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33Shannon (1948)
34 Weiner (1948)
35 Hodges, 1985, p 403. The 'past decade' was the forties and 'what had happened' was World War Two.
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39 The history of Al is well documented, enthusiastically in McCorduck (1979) and Johnson (1986) and
critically in Dreyfus (1992) among others.
40 McCorduck, 1979, pp 329 - 357
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41 Campbell, 1983, pp 34 - 43
42 For example the fact that the DNA chain is understood as a code is not a self-evident truth about
deoxyribonucleic acid, but rather reveals the framework of our understanding as essentially metaphoric.
DNA is, as Dr Brian Balmer, lecturer in the Philosophy of Science at UCL has described it (in conversa-
tion), 'just gloop'.
43 This term was explained to me by Dr Avon Huxor
44 The idea of the computer as giant brain, or mind machine, was one of the staples of science fiction in
the forties and fifties. The idea of the computer as a brain remained the basis of the understanding of
computers until recently. There are numerous examples in science fiction film and writing. Isaac Asimov
considered the issue of machine intelligence in the Robot series of short stories. Arthur C. Clarke
expressed views of the power of such machines in short stories such as The Nine Billion Names of God.
Perhaps the most powerful expression of this idea and also perhaps its most powerful critique is in
Stanley Kubrick's classic science-fiction film '2001 A Space Odyssey'. HAL 9000, the intelligent computer
on the space ship, is arguably the main character of the film. In a move typical of Kubrick it not only has
the best lines but also seems the most engaging and even human of all the characters. The scientists and
astronauts in the film are seemingly emotionless and almost autistically incommunicative. HAL is a
cogent expression of the computer as giant brain. The crew on the space ship converse with it as with
another human being. It is apparently responsive in human terms, even emotional. Despite this in the
end the machine cannot reconcile its apparent humanity with the demands of its underlying logic. In the
end it murders almost all the crew Jon Bird (in conversation) has pointed out the connection between
HAL and the figure of the monolith in the film. This monolith is a black slab that appears at crucial
moments in human history to direct leaps in human evolution in some mysterious manner. What it is
and how it works is beyond the comprehension of those confronted with it. Thus, like HAL, it is, and
indeed resembles literally, a black box, the engineering term for a piece of technology whose inner work-
ings are of no consequence to what it does, as long as it works. The humans respond to HAL as they
respond to the slab, without really understanding what is happening. Because HAL has been made to
appear human they do not understand how different and incomprehensible it is.
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48 Laurel, 1990, p 16
49 In a paper entitled 'Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances' (1980) Roman
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in communication. In order for a linguistic communication to be understood there must be a common
code understood by both the addresser and addressee. However, both parties need to know more than
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references relevant to that context. According to Jakobson such references in any message are of two dif-
ferent types. One type substitutes one term for another, based on a proposed similarity or analogy
between the two, the other substitutes one term for another based on proximity or contiguity between
the two. As Jakobson says.
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may lead to another either through their similarity or through their contiguity. The
METAPHORIC way would be the most appropriate term for the first case and the
METONYMIC way for the second, since they find their most condensed expression in metaphor
and metonymy respectively.' (Jakobson, 1980, p 90)
50 In a number of books such as Technics and Praxis (1979) and Postphenomenology (1993) Don Ihde has
explored this idea of praxis in relation to technology
51 I derive my observations in this passage from personal experience, and experience of teaching multi-
media to students and observing how they react to computers, and from conversations with fellow prac-
titioners and researchers.
52 MS-Dos stands for MicroSoft Drive Operating System. An operating system is the software that
enables the computer to start up, and to use other software, such as word processors and so forth. MS-
Dos was the operating system used by IBM in their first generations of personal computer, and is still
used in their present computers, though more sophisticated graphical interfaces are now more widely
used.MS-Dos is a 'command line' system requiring the user to type in instructions at a prompt from the
computer, in order to undertake any action.
53 The VAX is a 'mainframe', a type of large computer used typically by large institutions such as uni-
versities. It is the paradigm of centralised computing inasmuch as the actual computer is housed at some
central point in the institution, with users connected to it through 'dumb terminals', monitor and key-
board arrangements, which, through clever management of the computer's time, give the impression to
the user that he or she is sitting at the actual computer as the sole user
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54 Turkle, 1995, pp 181-2
55 Digital derives from the Latin for finger, and as Wilden points out using our fingers as counting
devices was the first example of digital computing (1972 p156). Analog devices such as the clock, the
thermometer and the accelerator pedal manipulate data in continuous quantities in a manner analogous
to the real situation their data represents.
56 Plato's role in instigating dualism is investigated by a number of feminist philosophers, including
Plumwood (1993) and Irigaray (1985)
57 Lakoff., 1987, pp 272 - 273
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CHAPTER TWO
The Museum, the Computer and Modernity
In the last chapter we saw how the computer, in terms of hardware, software,
interface design, and even the very nature of binary, digital computation itself,
is understood through metaphors of enclosure and separatedness. This would
seem a potentially useful basis for designing multimedia systems for repre-
senting museum collections. Museums and galleries are often described in
terms of interior spaces, boxes, as in, for example 0' Doherty's characterisation
of the gallery space as a 'white cube' l . Such images invoke the idea of the
museum or gallery as an enclosed container or space in which objects are
stored. This is similar to the how the modern personal computer is charac-
terised as a 'space' in which objects such as files and programs are stored.
The museum is a modern institution. It emerges out of the cabinets of curiosity
and kunstkammer of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 2 . Hooper-
Greenhill, following Foucault, has shown how its emergence is concomitant
with the supersession of the Renaissance by the classical episteme. Its modern-
ness is evinced in its separateness from the world. As such it can be seen as
similar to many other objects of the period.
The many striking examples of boundaries in the early modern period
of objects demand a similar contemplation of something in radical sepa-
ration from the world at large. The curtain that rises and falls in the
modern theatre, the covers of a book that separate a discourse in a way
that can never be done in a culture of oral performance, the frames that
surround paintings and make them the quintessential visual objects,
after the seventeenth century all reflect pot only the notion that an
object must be free standing, isolated, but the more essential scientific
notion that only closed systems have order and explainable identity.3
According to Walter Ong the origins of this 'scientific notion' of 'closed sys-
tems' was largely the result of printing, and the closure and packaging of
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knowledge that printing enabled 4. Anthony Wilden expands this to include
the...
... rise of individualism, the invention of perspective, Protestantism, the
discovery of alphabetical order for dictionaries, the ordering of practical
and abstract knowledge in the Encyclopedie, the invention of inter-
changeable machine parts, the standardisation of weights and measures,
Linnaeus' ordering of the species, the substitutions of legal codes and
constitutions for spontaneous common law, and the creation of stan-
dardised tasks in the factory system.5
According to Ong much of the basis of this thinking can be traced back to the
work of the Renaissance philosopher Petrus Ramus (1515 - 1572), otherwise
known as Pierre Ramee. Ramus , though not recognised as a great thinker, was
highly influential in different ways. For Ong he was largely responsible for
specific spatial models of knowledge and analysis.
Ramus had insisted that analysis opened ideas like boxes. It is certainly
significant that the post-ramist age produced so much more than its fair
share of books identified by their titles as "keys" to one thing or anoth-
er. In this same age the notion of "content" as applied to books is
extended, so that statements, the words of which statements consist,
and concepts or ideas themselves are habitually considered as "contain-
ing" truth. An epistemology based on the notion of truth as "content"
begins to appear. Out of the twin notions of analysis is bred the vast
idea-, system-, and method-literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. This literature consists of treatises on practically all conceiv-
able forms of knowledge labelled indiscriminately "ideas', or "systems"
or "methods" of the various subjects, and conceived of as box-like units
laid hold of by the mind in such a way that they are fully and adequate-
ly treated by being "opened" in an analysis.6
It is thus to Ramus that Ong ascribes the beginning of what he calls closed-sys-
tem or closed-field thinking.
Ramus' close-field thinking is absolute and imperious, welling out of
unconsciousness drives for completeness and security, (and thus in
some ways regressive to the self-enclosed, infantile stage represented by
the uroburos, the serpent with its tongue in its mouth-the thumb suck-
ing infant.)7
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The close-field thinking of Ramus spread mainly in Protestant Europe, and
had a great influence on Descartes and Bacon, and other thinkers responsible
for developing new methods of scientific enquiry. From Ramus in the sixteenth
century, through Newton and Kant through to the last century science and
philosophy has attempted to construct totalised and closed systems of knowl-
edge.8
Ong points out how the...
...closed system paradigm was encouraged by the new science of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in its reliance on seemingly closed-
system mathematics: the physical universe was assimilated to a closed
system, or, rather, a system of systems, each operating on purely mathe-
matical laws.9
This constituted one of Descartes's main strategies to gain certainty of knowl-
edge about the world, which was to base reason and knowledge on mathemat-
ical principles and thus avoid the mediating and, for him, obscuring part
played by language in their formulation. His ideas towards this end are encap-
sulated in his posthumously published Regulae ad directionem ingenii (Rules for
the Direction of the Mind).
The Regulae aims at the development of a generalised logic and a new
symbolic language, patterned on mathematics, but interpreted in a more
abstract and general sense, as universal mathematics, (mathesis universalis).
This conceptual interpretation of mathematics sets up a new perception
and standard of things, which is not derived experientially from them,
but which is rather imposed upon them as an axiomatic order to which
they must submit. Universal mathematics becomes the basis for
Descartes's elaboration of a new philosophical discourse and subject in
the Discours and the Meditations. •10
Artificial Intelligence
It is because of such ideas that it becomes possible to formulate the cOncept of
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the computer. If thinking can be represented in terms of mathematics, and if
mathematics, as a logical system, can be automated, then it is possible to build
a mechanical mind, a thinking machine. Writing about the science of thinking
machines, artificial intelligence, Vernon Pratt states that
...the conditions for thinking about it [Al] were not realised before the
great revolution in the Western conception of the world which occurred
in the seventeenth century and with which we associate with the rise of
modern science. The reason has nothing to do with scientific and techni-
cal advance bringing feasibility to a hitherto fantastic project. It is the
project itself, the very idea that thinking might go inside a machine, that
is born in the seventeenth century revolution. 11
The man most responsible for the development of such ideas at that time was
Gottfreid Leibniz (1646 - 1716) the German logician and mathematician.
Leibniz was not a follower of Descartes; he was opposed to him on many
grounds, and influenced by him in other ways. Descartes laid the ground of
instrumental and mathematical reason which dominated seventeenth-century
thinking, and constituted the point from which Leibniz developed his think-
ing. Leibniz was one of the first people to actually try building calculating
machines. His most famous practical attempt was the Leibniz Whee1. 12 He
also spent much of his time devising possible universal languages which antic-
ipate some of the principles behind modern programming languages. Indeed
what Leibniz conjectured was the possibility of mechanising reason. He devel-
oped a system of logic in which all logical relationships could be expressed in
mathematical terms. He further anticipated that it would be possible to com-
bine this with a machine similar to his calculating engine and crank out
answers to any problem as long as it could be expressed in logical terms.
Leibniz believed that once the totality of knowledge in the world had thus
been represented then science as a project would be complete. The whole of
knowledge could then be made available in perfect transparent clarity in a
comprehensive encyclopaedia. All questions and all disputes could then be
solved by calculating, using combinations of logical simples to arrive at the
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necessary understanding13.
Leibniz's project of the mechanical reasoner only became practically feasible
this century. Early kinds of electronic computing devices were built in the
nineteen-thirties, and the development of the technology was much advanced
by military demands in the second world war, in encryption, munitions and,
not least, the development of atomic weapons. Though first understood only
as a calculating machine, the electronic computer was being developed, as we
have seen in chapter one, at a time when a number of ideas, such as Norbert
Weiner's concept of Cybernetics and Claude Shannon's information theory,
were being developed. These along with ideas propounded by Alan Turing
led to the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) as an area of research. As the quote
from Pratt above suggests AT derives directly from the concept of the tran-
scendent subject as formulated by Descartes and others. It is predicated on the
idea that mathematical logic can represent the structure of the world and the
mental processes with which we apprehend that structure. A disembodied
consciousness is passive, receiving a mirror image of the world, rather than
interacting with it. Dreyfus opines that the problems of AT derived from this
predication.
An old rationalist dream was at the heart of the problem. GOFAI [Good
Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence] is based on the Cartesian idea that
all understanding consists in forming and using appropriate symbolic
representations. For Descartes, these representations were complex
descriptions built up out of primitive ideas or elements. Kant added the
important idea that all concepts are rules for relating such elements, and
Frege showed that rules could be formalised so they could be manipu-
lated without intuition or interpretation. Given the nature of computers
as possible formal symbol processors, Al turned this rationalist vision
into a research program and took up the search for the primitives and
formal rules that captured everyday knowledge.14
Markova has also argued that Al is deeply indebted to Cartesian ideas of pas-
sivity and disembodiment.
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There is a close parallel between the philosophical views concerning the
passivity of the mind and the presuppositions of information-processing
approaches to cognitive processes. The assumption of the seventeenth
century philosophers that external and internal stimuli impinge upon
our senses and that these accept information for further processing has
also been adopted by modern psychologists concerned with the study of
cognitive processes. The statements of the empirical philosophers , such
as 'impressions strike upon the mind', or 'ideas enter the mind through
the senses', have been altered into the more modern one, 'information
enters the cognitive system through sensory processes', but the gist of
the statement remains the same.15
Thus AT embodies the Cartesian notion of the mind as a space in which
impressions are received, a 'passive vessel' or Istorehouse' 16 , with a limited
capacity. Thus it exemplifies the discourse of interiority's concept of the mind
as an interior and closed off space 17. Al comes out of a particular discursive
structure. Descartes's ideas of transcendence, closure and certainty dominate
the AT project. At the heart of Descartes's ideas is the desire to escape the
mediating influences of language and bodily experience, which contemporary
writers such as Montaigne, and later philosophers, such as Hegel, and in this
century Merleau-Ponty, see as crucial to self consciousness.18
Virtual Reality
Another area of development in computing, Virtual Reality (VR), is equally
derived from the Cartesian notion of the transcendent subject, and as such
equally contingent upon cultural constructions of reality and the world. Like
AT it is predicated on the idea that a set of facts about the world, in this case
concerning our visual experience of it, that can be reconstructed in the com-
puter. VR is based on the idea of using computer techniques of representing
space in such a way as to give a user a sense of being in a real place. This has
meant developing interfaces, such as headsets, which enabled the user to feel
immersed in the computer scene, and to develop fast enough hardware and
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software to respond to user's movements in 'real time'. Some form of VR had
actually been around since the mid sixties. In 1965 a researcher at MIT Ivan
Sutherland built the first head mounted CRT display, a device which could
relay the movements of a user's head to a computer, which in response could
redraw a three dimensional scene on TV screens mounted immediately in front
the user's eyes19 . Other early VR applications included the flight simulator, a
device for training pilots, where the computer-generated landscape seen by the
'pilot' could alter in immediate response to how she or he operated the con-
trols. Flight simulators were early examples of VR because airlines could
afford the large and expensive computers capable of real-time graphics20.
There were other, more idiosyncratic developments in the sixties and seventies
such as the reality devices of Morton Heilig and the artificial reality installa-
tions built by Myron Krueger. Mostly during this period its development,
being costly, was mainly restricted to big businesses, NASA, the military and
well-endowed universities. But by the end of the eighties personal computers
were fast enough to support VR. Appropriate hardware such as headsets were
developed by companies like Jaron Lanier's VPL. Anybody with a few thou-
sand pounds could experience existence in a virtual world, necessarily crude,
but responsive to the user's moves21.
In the late nineteen eighties and nineteen nineties it became possible to make
VR systems which were comparatively cheap and accessible. Great claims
were made on VR's behalf. Its future use was described in communications,
medicine, information dissemination and even sex. 22 But VR, for all its procla-
mations of being a revolutionary idea, is arguably no more than the latest
manifestation of a centuries-old culturally determined way of representing
space. The principles underlying VR go back to the fifteenth century. It was
then that Alberti codified the techniques to allow painters to represent reality
based on the way light hit the retina. 23 He suggested that an artist imagine a
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plane of glass between himself and the scene he wished to reproduce and to
copy the shapes as they appear on the glass24 . This is a powerful way of rep-
resenting space, yet some argue it remains a code, one among many; one also
with no preeminent claim to representing reality better or more accurately
than others25 . As Steve Neale puts it in his book Cinema and Technology.
It is an ideal of space, of position and, indeed, of vision itself. An ideal;
for not only is perspective as a system false to the movement of the eye
in constructing for it a fixed and static position, it is false, also as a sys-
tem of representation inscribed on a two-dimensional surface to the
curvilinear nature of the sphere of vision.26
As a code it embodies the understandings, needs and desires of the culture
which produced it. Francastel writes.
...It is men who create the space in which they move and express them-
selves. Spaces are born and die like societies; they live, they have a his-
tory. In the fifteenth century... Western Societies organised in the materi-
al and intellectual senses of the term, a space completely different from
that of the preceding generations; with their technical superiority, they
progressively imposed that space over the planet. 27
Albertian perspective was predicated on the notion of a disembodied viewer,
one whose physical self is no longer of account in his experience of perception.
His28
 view is also monocular and static, which as Neale points out is false to
the binocular, saccadic nature of physiological vision. It is these factors that
allow space to be understood and represented mathematically. Martin Jay has
pointed out that...
...a number of implications followed from the adoption of this visual
order. The abstract coldness of the perspectival gaze meant the with-
drawal of the painter's emotional entanglement with the objects depict-
ed in geometricalized space. The participatory involvement of more
absorptive visual modes was diminished, if not entirely suppressed, as
the gap between spectator and spectacle widened. The moment of erotic
projection in vision-what St. Augustine had anxiously condemned as
"ocular desire"-was lost as the bodies of the painter and viewer were
forgotten in the name of an allegedly disincarnated, absolute eye.
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Although such a gaze could , of course, still fall on objects of desire... it
did so largely in the service of a reifying male look that turned its tar-
gets into stone. 29
This notion of privileged spectators gazing onto a scene from which they are
separate and transcendent, was of great significance for Descartes. Indeed the
influence of Albertian perspective on Descartes and the importance of
Descartes' consequent visualist paradigm is such that 'Cartesian
Perspectivalism' has become a term to describe Cartesian philosophy.30
Richard Rorty has pointed out how 'the intellect inspects entities modelled on
retinal images. ..In Descartes's conception—the one that became the basis of
'modern' epistemology—it is representations which are in the mind.' 31
 Jay
points out that Descartes may thus have been responsible for founding the
speculative tradition of identitiarian reflexivity, in which the subject is certain
only of its mirror image.
An analysis of this idea of the separate and trancendent subject, and its rela-
tion to scientific knowledge, led Heidegger to formulate his notion of the 'Age
of the World Picture'. In the essay of that name Heidegger characterises scien-
tific modernity as being capable, unlike the Greek and mediaeval epistemes, of
perceiving of the world as a picture, owing to the emergence of man 32
 as a
subject, who sets himself in front of, and separate from, the world of objects.
This particular stance enables man to have an instrumental relationship
towards the world, which he can treat as a 'standing reserve' for his use and
exploitation.
Where the world becomes picture, what is, in its entirety, is juxtaposed
as that for which man is prepared and which, correspondingly, he there-
fore intends to bring before himself and have before himself, and conse-
quently intends in a decisive sense to set in place before himself... Hence
world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of
the world but the world conceived of and grasped as a picture.33
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The Camera Obscura
For all the proclamations of its status as a revolutionary technology VR is
4
arguably deeply rooted in
the ideology of scientific
modernity, as initiated by
Descartes. It is, like AI, a
seventeenth-century idea.
Arguably it most resem-
bles a paradigmatic appa-
ratus of that century, the
camera obscura (figure 6),
the enclosed chamber in which images of the outside world
Figure 6. A camera obscura
are projected
through lenses. Jonathan Crary has examined the importance of the camera
obscura in forming the epistemological paradigm of the observer/subject
which emerged with modernity. 34 He points out that for two hundred years it
subsisted as a philosophical metaphor, a model for rationalist and empiricist
thought. He says that...
...[t]he space of the camera obscura, its enclosedness, its darkness, its
separation from an exterior, incarnate Descartes's "I will now shut my
eyes, I shall stop my ears, I shall now disregard my senses." 35
Crary expresses thus the relationship between the model of the camera obscu-
ra and the discourse of interiority.
...the camera obscura is bound up with a metaphysic of interiority. It is
a figure for the observer who is nominally a free sovereign individual
but who is also a privatized isolated subject enclosed in a quasi-domes-
tic space separated from a public exterior world. It defined an observer
who was subjected to an inflexible set of positions and divisions. The
visual world could be appropriated by an autonomous subject but only
as a private unitary consciousness detached from any active relation-
ship with an exterior.36
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Al, VR and the Museum
I suggest that it is no coincidence that the museum began to emerge at the
same time as the camera obscura and the paradigm of albertian-cartesian per-
spectivalism37. The sense of separateness, closure and transcendence that typi-
fies that paradigm is found also in the museum. It is like the privileged specta-
tor gazing onto a scene from which he is separate and transcendent. As Pearce
remarks discussing the history of the modern museum.
The European relationship with the material world appears to be inti-
mately bound up with two of the distinguishing features of the
European tradition. The first of these is its willingness to view the world
of matter as external and 'objective' to the knowing human subject, a
notion fundamental to modern European philosophy since Descartes.38
The reliance on retinal images that Richard Rorty describes as the basis of
'modern' epistemology is related to the reliance on the actual visible presence
of the object in the museum. 'The point of collections and museums... revolves
around the possession of 'real things"39. Thus one might say that the muse-
um, like the Cartesian mind, is a space in which objects from the outside world
are contained and placed in structures to reflect an understanding of that
world. In keeping with the discourse of scientific reason this structuring and
understanding are understood to be logical and complete, or at least to aim
towards an idea of completeness. Museums and museum displays have not, at
least until recently, been visibly authored. The displays are presented as a
reflection of the outside world in the unmediated chamber of the gallery space.
Exhibition, the belief that knowledge can be laid out as a demonstration
in temporal three-dimensional space and that this is morally desirable
and promotes the development of fresh knowledge, is itself a meta-nar-
rative of the modern world. It is an overarching image which tran-
scends the individual topics upon which any particular exhibition
might concentrate. Exhibition is a characteristic construction of the age,
like the printed book, the framed picture, the secular musical or theatri-
cal performance. It is the opus which demonstrates the work of collec-
tion and curation, and the creation of the lattice of reference and interre-
41
lationship, which requires controlled space for its exposition.40
The museum can perhaps therefore be understood as a kind of Cyberspace, in
which knowledge is ordered and represented in the form of three-dimensional
objects in a three-dimensional space, and through which users can move. The
actual term Cyberspace was originally coined by the science fiction writer
William Gibson. It can, and has been taken to mean, any set of electronic con-
nections enabling communication, such as the telephone system. More usually
it refers to future application of virtual reality technology to the structuring
and display of data, accessible to users through a future form of the Internet.
Gibson describes it thus.
Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of
legitimate operators in every nation, by children being taught mathe-
matical concepts... A graphic representation of data abstracted from the
banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity.
Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constel-
lations of data. Like city lights, receding.. 41
This concept has often been quoted with approval by many people working in
the field of computers; this for instance is Michael Benedikt, Professor in the
School of Architecture at the University of Texas, from a paper given at the
'first Cyberspace conference', held in Texas in 1990.
...it is proposed that the creation of Cyberspace is not only good, but
necessary, and even inevitable step... toward providing the maximum
number of individuals the means of creativity, productivity and control
over the shapes of their lives within the new information and media
environment. 42
Benedikt is aware, along with other advocates of Cyberspace, that Gibson's
conception paints a far from encouraging picture of a future that contains such
technology Here information is a commodity controlled by vast corporations,
who defend their virtual data citadels like crusader castles against the incur-
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sion of hackers, known as console jockeys, and missile-like viruses. This does
not stop Benedikt, or others, advocating the development of cyberspace
As a 'proto-cyberspace' the museum is, in my opinion, an ideal object through
which to criticise the thinking behind Cyberspace, as, similarly, Cyberspace
enables a critique of the museum. This is evinced as well as anywhere by
Apple Computer's Virtual Museum. (figure 7). This was a project set up
between Apple Computers and New York University to demonstrate some
Figure 7. Screenshot from Apple's Virtual Museum
ideas being developed at Apple concerning the representation of three-dimen-
sional spaces. It also purported to represent a new way of showing museum
collections on computer. The collection of objects in their system is shown as
being situated in a three-dimensional model of an imaginary museum, in
which the user can move around by clicking the mouse while pointing the cur-
sor at whichever object they wish to approach. At first sight this may seem rea-
sonable, since this is how an actual physical museum works, yet it fails to
question the basic assumption that the way museums arrange and display
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objects is satisfactory. In a museum an object can only be physically situated
in one place, even though it might be relevant in many contexts. Furthermore
it is an inevitable consequence of our physical being that to get from one place
to another we must pass through all the places that lie in between. Thus
objects in museums are not only placed in only one context, but almost
inevitably in some kind of linear narrative imposed by the order of rooms.
Perhaps more insidiously the simple narratives enforced by such static
arrangements are congruent with enlightenment notions of progress. Philip
Fisher describes this idea cogently.
Architecturally, the museum is made up oi rooms and paths. Once the
pictures face us in a line on the wall we can convert rooms to paths by
moving sideways from the entrance around the room, flattening it out,
in effect, onto the wall. Viewing the pictures sequentially as we move
from room to room, we follow the room numbers, the centuries, the
schools. In so far as the museum becomes pure path, abandoning the
dense spatial rooms of what were once homes, or, of course, the highly
sophisticated space of a cathedral, it becomes a more perfect image of
history, or rather the single, linear motion of history preferred since
Winckelmann.43
In the National Gallery, for example, the notion of the history of art as a pro-
gression towards ever greater levels of sophistication is implicit in the chrono-
logical arrangement of the galleries. This is further emphasised by the order in
which the visitor is encouraged to move through the gallery. If they use the
Trafalgar Square entrance the most obvious and easiest route is starting with
the rooms on the left, which contain the Italian Primitives, and proceeding
round to the impressionists at the end. Implicitly or explicitly this arrangement
suggests that the history of art consists of progress towards ever greater tri-
umphs of mimetic representation. This suggestion would have been even
stronger before the 'epistemological break' of impressionism, and even they
are concerned with objective truth in visual representation.
Such a metaphor is more problematic, than might at first appear. The
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metaphor of the box or interior space suggest the way in which the museum is
a privileged space, separated out from the world it seeks to represent. Aspects
of this have been a theme of many writers from the beginning of museological
criticism. Sherman shows how the 'first full-fledged critic of art museums'
Quatremere de Quincy was proclaiming that museums drained the life out of
objects almost as soon as the modern museum emerged44. Similar criticisms
can be found in, among others, Valery (1960) and Adorno (1982). Fisher shows
how in a museum the meaning of an object is reduced to one or two dimen-
sions of its multidimensional complexity. For example a sword can be dis-
played as a weapon alongside other weapons, or as an example of metalwork,
or as a ritual object, or placed in a specific cultural context, as, for example, a
typical artifact of its country of origin. Museum displays can effectively show
one of these contexts, but it is hard to imagine one which could encompass
effectively all these aspects of the object. Whatever context the object is shown,
in a museum it is decontextualised, removed from any world in which it oper-
ates properly as an object and laid to rest in an afterworld for objects. Museum
and gallery spaces are, as Pearce puts it 'a closely defined production, follow-
ing their own clearly marked conventions, which form their own mode of
showing and telling, with characteristic limitations and possibilities.'45
Such 'virtual museums' recreate the experience of the classical museum in
which our bodies are of no consequence except to move us from one spectacle
to another. We cannot experience objects in a museum other than visually. We
gain no knowledge of them haptically or bodily, rarely even audially. Objects
in museums are displayed, usually behind glass, or some other barrier, entirely
for the benefit of the eyes. In a museum we thus become a disembodied
Cartesian eye. Bohrer makes an explicit comparison between the kind of visual
representation offered by the museum and the idea of presence as used in liter-
ary deconstruction, most notably by Jacques Derrida. He quotes Christopher
Norris's definition of presence as 'a God's eye view that would finally tran-
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scend all mere relativities of time and space', as defining the museum's assem-
bly of objects.46
Conclusion
I have taken the view that there is a connection between the interior but . disin-
carnate mind of Descartes, and the kind of perception of space as envisaged by
VR, and projected for Cyberspace. Far from being a revolutionary technology
both merely realise Cartesian notions both of representing the world through
mathesis, and of separating the viewer subject from the world of objects. VR,
like its predecessor, perspectival painting, imposes an ideologically deter-
mined vision of the world that is intimately bound up with instrumental ratio-
nality. Like AT it expresses not just a modern sensibility, but a specific early
modern Cartesian vision of the world. Both Al and VR are bound up in the
discourse of separateness, closure and transcendence that characterises
Cartesian philosophy.
The museum also aims to be separate, transcendent, as well as relying on the
presence of the actual object and the primacy of vision, all of which are charac-
teristic of modernity. Thus it would seem an ideal candidate for representation
as a kind of Cyberspace. But the kinds of space and representation of which
Cyberspace and the museum are both manifestations are increasingly being
critiqued, both in terms of their underlying ideology and their inadequacies to
the task of representing knowledge.
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CHAPTER THREE
Critique of Perspectivalism
In the last chapter I examined how both the museum and the computer can be
seen to exemplify a certain way of understanding and representing the world,
one bound up with instrumental rationality, and with claims of access to tran-
scendent truths. Such an understanding of the world is problematic. In
Heidegger's formulation the Cartesian subject confronts the world as a picture.
Nietzsche was among the first to point out the problem with the visual and
perspectival metaphors underpinning western metaphysics.
Let us be on guard against the hallowed philosopher's myth of a "pure,
will-less, painless, timeless, knower"; let us beware of the tentacles of
such contradictory notions as "pure reason," "absolute knowledge,"
"absolute intelligence." All these concepts presuppose an eye such as no
living being can imagine, an eye required to have no direction, to abro-
gate its active and interpretative powers-precisely those powers that
alone make of seeing, seeing something. All seeing is essentially per-
spective, and so is all knowing.1
Nietzsche thus introduced the spectre of relativism into the supposedly pure
Cartesian notion of transcendent vision. He invokes a vision of monadical
viewpoints, each separate and with a separate vision, but lacking Leibniz's
. divine determinism. The Genealogy of Morals, in which Nietzsche wrote the
above passage, was published in 1887. He was writing at a time when the
Cartesian model of representation and epistemology was starting to be chal-
lenged, in art, philosophy and in understanding in general. Jonathan Crary
(1990) has shown how in the early nineteenth century a number of circum-
stances combined to bring the then dominant Cartesian model of vision to a
crisis, and to allow its supercession by a new paradigm. These circumstances
included research into the physiological aspects of vision and the development
of the camera. Crary suggests that the radical reconfigurations of vision that
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are normally understood to surface with modernist painting in the 1870s and
1880s, in fact emerge in the 1840s. What Crary particularly focuses on is the
collapse of the idea of the camera obscura as a model for vision and epistemolo-
gy, a position it had held since the time of Descartes. Without denying the his-
torical connection between the camera obscura and the camera in terms of tech-
nological development he suggests that the camera brought about an entirely
different paradigm of vision and subjectivity.2
The "real world" that the camera obscura had stabilised for two cen-
turies was no longer.., the most useful valuable world. The modernity
enveloping Turner, Fechner and their heirs had no need of its kind of
truth and immutable identities. A more adaptable, autonomous and
productive observer was needed in both discourse and practice-to con-
form to new functions of the body and to a vast proliferation of indiffer-
ent and convertible signs and images. Modernization effected a deterri-
torialization and a revaluation of vision.3
At the same time as the changes Crary describes were taking place other seem-
ingly stable ideas were being challenged concerning space. Most radically
among these were the laws of geometry devised by Euclid which suggested a
universal and homogeneous space. Euclid's laws had, for two millennia, been
accepted as true and immutable. Kant, for example, thought these laws neces-
sarily true and were therefore synthetic judgments a priori. But one of Euclid's
postulates contained weaknesses which enabled other geometries to challenge
Euclid's claim to be the only true system. The fifth postulate is an axiom that
states that it is possible to draw only one straight line parallel to a given
straight line in the same plane. In 1830, at the same time as Crary shows that
the study of the physiology of sight was changing the . understanding of per-
ception, the Russian mathematician Lobatchewsky refuted Euclid's fifth postu-
late by proposing other axioms allowing the development of a two-dimension-
al geometry in which a number of lines could be drawn through any point
parallel to another line on the same plane. In 1854 the mathematician Reimann
devised another form of geometry that defied Euclid's laws4.
50
In the late nineteenth century, at the time Nietzsche was proclaiming the rela-
tivism inherent in perspectival metaphysics, painters were trying to find ways
of representing space congruent with the new paradigm of subjectivity.
Cezanne, in particular, sought to render space in a manner that respected the
flatness of the surface, and the subjective responses of the artist while still
showing a recognisable space. In Cezanne, and other impressionists and post-
impressionists, the 'deterritorialization' and 'revaluation of vision' described
by Crary finds its most cogent expression5 .
At the turn of the century scientists such as Poincare and Mach defined spaces
other than the geometric; visual, tactile and motor spaces in Poincare's case
and visual, auditory and tactile in the case of Mach. At the same time Einstein
was working towards the full development of his theory of relativity, which
would shatter the homogeneous, enclosed, Newtonian universe. Indeed
throughout the nineteenth century the closed systems that had dominated
western science and philosophy were under critical scrutiny. The ordered uni-
verse of Descartes, Leibniz, Newton and Kant became increasingly untenable.
Their, in Ong's words 'closed-system or closed-field thinking' 'welling out of
unconsciousness drives for completeness and security' is no longer adequate
to the needs of and possibilities offered by art, science and philosophy6.
Collapse of a Space
By the beginning of this century these various developments had effected
some of the ways the world was represented and understood.
The fact is that around 1910 a certain space was shattered. It was the
space of common sense, of knowledge, of social practice of political
power, a space thitherto enshrined in everyday discourse, just as in
abstract thought, as the environment of and channel for communica-
tions; the space too, of classical perspective and geometry, developed
from the Renaissance onwards on the basis of the Greek tradition
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(Euclid, logic) and bodied forth in Western art and philosophy, as in the
form of the city and town... Euclidian and perspectivist space have dis-
appeared as systems of reference, along with other former 'common-
places' such as the town, history, paternity, the tonal system in music,
traditional morality and so forth. This was truly a crucial moment.7
This shattering of space found obvious expression in the visual arts. The futur-
ists attempted to represent the dynamic appearance of movement and speed,
especially as enabled by the new technologies of transportation. The Cubists
continued the work of Cezanne in representing space in a manner both subjec-
tive and recognisable.
The two pioneers of cubism, Picasso and Braque, incorporated the inno-
vations of Cezanne and the cinema and brought about the most impor-
tant revolution in the rendering of space in painting since the fifteenth
century. They abandoned the homogeneous space of linear perspective
and painted objects in a multiplicity of spaces from multiple perspec-
tives with x-ray-like views of their interiors.8
Donald Lowe sees cubism as part of a perceptual revolution which...
... transformed the bourgeois field of perception. In a number of quite
different, unrelated disciplines, visual, rational linearality was over-
thrown. What emerged in this stead can best be characterised as multi-
perspectivity, i.e., the acceptance of different perspectival relations with-
in a single discipline... This new perceptual field, constituted by an elec-
tronic culture, by the extrapolation of hearing and seeing, is prevailing
over the old bourgeois field of perception... 9
Some of these different modes of representation have found corollaries in
recent developments in computing. Over the last ten years the computer has
become a medium for another way of structuring and representing knowl-
edge, known as hypertext, hypermedia and multimedia. These are the differ-
ent names given to the capacity of the computer to deliver information in a
variety of ways, text, graphics, video, animation, sound and so on, as well as
making multiple links between discrete portions of information. Above all
they are interactive, meaning that the user is enabled to take decisions about
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how, to what extent, and in what order, the information is accessed and pre-
sented. By harnessing the power of the computer in this way we can dramati-
cally change the way we access information. The user of such a system can
choose his or her own path through the increasing mass of data, making asso-
ciative leaps between ideas in a way that could not be represented in terms of
classical Albertian-Cartesian spatial representation.
Though it has only recently become a practical possibility the concept underly-
ing hypermedia and multimedia can be traced back to an article written by
Vannevar Bush, a special advisor to Roosevelt, and published in 1945 in the
Atlantic Monthly.
described his ideas for a mechanically linked information retrieval service,
which he named Memex. This service would allow the operator to input text,
drawings and notes through a dry photocopier or through head-mounted
stereo camera spectacles. This information could be stored in a microfiche fil-
ing system. Several files could be displayed at a time, and a simple code
would store linked or related files. Though Bush's concept of the Memex sys-
tem was in terms of the photo-mechanical technologies then available, he
anticipated much of the technology that would characterise computer hyper-
media. As well as the above ideas Bush also envisaged data compression,
information exchange with other users and voice recognition 12 . Most impor-
tantly Bush introduced the notion of 'associative indexing'. In 'As We May
Think' he declared that the human mind...
... operates by association. With one item in its grasp, it snaps instantly
to the next that is suggested by the association of thoughts, in accor-
dance to some intricate web of trails carried out by the cells of the
brain.13
The most important aspect of Bush's system was the power given to the user
to make trails through the mass of information and record those trails, which
can be followed and annotated by other users. It is this capacity in particular
10 11 In this article, entitled 'As We May Think', Bush
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which has come to characterise hypermedia and multimedia as we now under-
stand it.
Bush's ideas were a crucial influence on a generation of computer scientists
and thinkers, preeminent among them Douglas Englebart, Theodor Nelson
and Alan Kay. Englebart had read 'As We May Think' while serving in the US
Army as a radar technician. This along with his army experience enabled him
to come to a radical understanding of the potential of computers.
When I first heard about computers, I understood from my radar expe-
rience during the war that if these machines can show you information
on printouts, they could show you that information on the screen.
When I saw the connection between a television-like screen, an informa-
tion processor and a medium for representing symbols to a person it all
tumbled together in about half an hour. I went home and sketched a
system in which computers would draw symbols on the screen and I
could steer through different information spaces with knobs and levers
and look at words and data and graphics in different ways. I imagined
ways you could expand it to a theatre-like environment where you
could sit with colleagues and exchange information on many levels
simultaneously. God! Think how that would cut you loose in solving
problems! 14
By 1968, as part of his Augmentation project, devoted to developing systems
for the 'augmentation of man's intellect' Englebart's inspiration led him to
,
develop the NLS (oN Line System). This system contained many of the fea-
tures which came to characterise hypermedia, including the mouse, windows,
electronic mail, word processing and hypertext.15
The term hypertext was coined by Theodor Nelson in the 1960s, to describe
the new form of non-sequential writing made possible by the computer. He
later coined the term hypermedia to suggest the incorporation of other media
types, such as pictures, sound and animation. Nelson's contribution was par-
ticularly crucial in the development of these ideas. His major project, which he
called Xanadu, called for the totality of the world's knowledge to be digitally
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encoded and stored from whence it could be piped to terminals all over the
world. Users could then come and search through the database making asso-
ciative jumps and links. New readings and thus new texts could be continu-
ously created. Links a user makes would be preserved for other users to see
and thus networks of, and links between items of knowledge could be con-
structed. Nelson's actual scheme has not been properly implemented, but it
has been a great influence on how we now perceive hypermedia.16
Alan Kay was similarly influential with his notion of the Dynabook, a book-
sized portable hypermedia system, which he modelled out of cardboard in
1968. Though never built as he envisaged it, the Dynabook has had a clear
influence on the laptops and PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants, small hand-
held computers like the Apple Newton) which are increasingly popular in the
computer market. Subsequently Kay worked at the XeroxPARC research labo-
ratories, where, under his guidance, his ideas and those of Englebart and
Nelson were developed, including as well as the above, icons, software agents
and scripting languages. Xerox failed to exploit properly the ideas developed
under their aegis. They developed a full system of computers designed for use
in the office, which incorporated the developments, but it was too expensive to
succeed commercially17. The XeroxPARC ideas were subsequently taken up by
Steve Jobs of Apple, who saw that they would be ideal for Apple's new com-
puter, the Macintosh18. The success of the Macintosh, and the imitations its
graphical interface has engendered, such as MicroSoft's Windows has meant
that multimedia and hypermedia have become an important aspect of comput-
ino .
Hypermedia and Museums
In the last few years museums have begun to exploit the possibilities of multi-
media and hypermedia. As a representative example of this I shall examine the
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Micro Gallery in London's National Gallery 20. Though by now some five years
old it remains exemplary of the kind of work done in museums. It was intend-
ed by the National Gallery to be placed in their Sainsbury Wing, the building
built onto the west side of the Gallery, paid for by the Sainsbury family, to
house the Early Renaissance collection. The development of the system was
sponsored by American Express.21
In the Gallery the system is accessible on twelve computers housed in a room
Figure 8. Screenshot from the Micro Gallery
on the mezzanine floor of the Sainsbury Wing. To use it the visitor sits in a
chair facing one of the computer monitors. He or she is presented with a list of
possible ways of viewing the collection. By touching the screen on the appro-
priate choice he or she can look at the collection either by artist, subject, or his-
torical period and country (figure 8). The user can read about an artist (figure
9) and go straight to an entry on any of their paintings, by clicking on a small
representation of that painting, go to other artist's entries, by clicking on their
name. When an obscure word is clicked on a definition will pop up on screen.
Each painting sits on a number of different axes, which can each be further
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Figure 9. Screenshot from the Micro Gallery
explored (figure 10). There are also animations showing, for example, how the
skull in Holbein's The Ambassadors should look as the viewer moves into the
position to see it undistorted .22
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This approach does, to some extent, deal with some of the problems concern-
ing space and organisation I discussed in the last chapter. An artifact, or any
chunk of information is not constrained to remain in one physical site and
therefore in one context. There can be multiple perspectives on one artifact and
multiple links off it. It suggests therefore a different kind of space to that
offered by Cyberspace, one that is possibly more in keeping with our sensitivi-
ty to relative points of view. Yet such systems are also problematic in other
ways. They are closed, offering the user no chance of real interaction, for the
contents and links are all preordained by the writers or designers. Contrary to
some of the claims made by many proponents of multimedia, which suggest
that the user makes his or her own reading23, these systems maintain the stan-
dard book-derived heirarchy of author and reader. Indeed it could be claimed
that, barring the ability to use sound and moving pictures, there is nothing a
multimedia system can offer that is not already found in a well-organised and
indexed book.
Since the Micro Gallery there have been a number of similar projects in other
museums. Cognitive Applications have produced Micro Gallery-style systems
for the National Gallery of Washington, and the San Diego Museum of Fine
Art. The Louvre in France has produced a CDRom about its collection (figure
11) as has the Chicago Gallery of Art. The Smithsonian has also produced a
CDi product about its collections. These products and systems differ in content
and approach. The Louvre CDRom, for example, concentrates far more on the
Louvre as a building and the arrangement of works of art within it. Despite
any such differences the same criticism such as those I have made about the
Micro Gallery can be applied. These products also remain, effectively, books.
In the case of these products I suggest that this means they present an under-
standing of the collection as permitted and legitimised by the institution.
These are presented in the form of closed media, CDRom, or public access
computers, to which a user has no more access than allowed either by the limi-
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Figure 11. Screenshot from the Louvre Disc
tations of the medium, or that of the situation. In one sense this is not a legiti-
mate criticism. It begs the question of why the National Gallery, or any similar
institution, should develop and fund a multimedia system, or indeed any form
of information device, video, book, which might undermine or criticise how
they wish to present their collections? In developing the Micro Gallery the
National Gallery has, arguably, performed a valuable public service by giving
the public a useful and accessible guide to their collections; one that might
draw in those who are possibly alienated by catalogues, or wish to find infor-
mation quickly.
Yet the Micro Gallery cannot help but raise questions and promote unease
about museums and the representation of knowledge. There are for example
obvious questions about authority and legitimation. The system was funded
by American Express and is sited in a building funded by the Sainsburys. The
artist Hans Haacke has written about the relationship between business inter-
ests, sponsorship and the museum.
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Through naiveté, need, or addiction to corporate financing museums
are now on the slippery road to becoming public relations agents for the
interests of big business and its ideological allies. The adjustments that
museums make in the selection and promotion of works for exhibition
and in the way they present them create a climate that supports prevail-
ing distributions of power and capital and persuades the populace that
the status quo is the natural and best order of things. Rather than spon-
soring intelligent, critical awareness, museums thus tend to foster
appeasement.24
The way that multimedia is presently being used in and by museums would
seem to be part of this process of fostering appeasement, rather than fostering
'intelligent, critical awareness'. 25
 Haacke's critique is part of a larger debate
concerning how museums present artefacts, and the kinds of hierarchies and
valuations suggested by the presentations. At the same time as Haacke sees
museums colluding, however unconsciously, with big business to sustain the
idea of the 'status quo' as the best order of things, that order is subject to much
debate and discussion. The problems of collecting, categorising and the muse-
um in general in a postmodern world are the subjects of a number of works
including those by Karp and Levine (1991), Walsh (1992), Hewison (1982),
Pearce (1992), Vergo (1989), and Hooper-Greenhill (1992). In these works the
museum is discussed as revealing itself as an institution of power and enfram-
ing. Such critiques reflect the sense that the 'museum experience is no longer a
transparent and untroubled phenomenon.' 26 They acknowledge that the muse-
um is subject to the same doubts about perspective, power and meaning as
other aspects of western culture. In particular its claims to having a 'Gods eye
view' has become increasingly contested. Yet the use of multimedia in muse-
ums seems in general concerned to present just such a view.
It seems to me that multimedia is potentially a more radical and liberating
medium than its present use might suggest. Its potential as such has been dis-
cussed by a number of writers of a broadly postmodernist persuasion. Yet little
of the available product shows evidence of this potential. Paradoxically the
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museum may be the place in which such potential could be realised. Hans
Haacke writes that...
...Even though [museums] may not agree with the systems of beliefs
dominant at the time, their options not to subscribe to them and instead
promote an alternative consciousness are limited. The survival of the
institution and personal careers are often at stake. But in nondictatorial
societies, the means for the production of consciousness are not all in
one hand. The sophistication required to promote a particular interpre-
tation of the world is potentially also available to question that interpre-
tation and to offer other versions. As the need to spend enormous sums
for public relations and government propaganda indicates, things are
not frozen. Political constellations shift and unincorporated zones exist
in sufficient numbers to disturb the mainstream.27
The computer is assuredly a powerful 'means for the production of conscious-
ness'. Possibly more than other such means, it offers the potential both to ques-
tion particular interpretations of the world, and to offer new and different ver-
sions. This is owing both to the ways of manipulating information, and the
means of distributing that information made possible by digital technology.
Yet so far, at least as far as representations of material culture is concerned, it
has failed to fulfil its potential in this way. Such representations remain, as we
have seen, bound up in structures of authority and closure. This is both par-
tially owing to and evinced by the powerful metaphors of the museum and the
book which are employed, it would seem by default, in such matters. What is
needed are different metaphors and different strategies which might enable
new ways of looking at such material.
Collage and the Ruins of the Museum
A method to find these is to examine the museum as a metaphor, not in the
terms in which it presents itself, but with attention to its contradictions and
aporiae.28 The museum as an institution is sustained by its ability to
homogenise heterogeneous elements into a coherent whole. Yet this is, accord-
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ing to Eugenio Donato, a fiction
The set of objects the Museum displays is sustained only by the fiction
that they somehow constitute a coherent representational universe. The
fiction is that a repeated metonymic displacement of fragment for totali-
ty, object to label, series of objects to series of labels, can still produce a
representation which is somehow adequate to a nonlinguistic universe.
Such a fiction is the result of an uncritical belief in the notion that order-
ing and classifying, that is to say, the spatial juxtaposition of fragments,
can produce a representational understanding of the world. Should the
fiction disappear, there is nothing left of the Museum but "bric-a-brac,"
a heap of meaningless and valueless fragments of objects which are
incapable of substituting themselves either metonymically for the origi-
nal objects or metaphorically for their representations.29
Similarly Douglas Crimp writes that 'the history of museology is a history of
all the various attempts to deny the heterogeneity of the museum, to reduce it
to a homogeneous system or series.' 30 Stripped of its pretensions the museum
is reduced to what Paul Valery described as a 'strange organised disorder'31.
He compared the museum to a room where ten orchestras play simultaneous-
ly, each vying for the attention of the listener32. Each object in a room, jealous
and demanding attention, 'kills all the others around it'. Crimp, Donato and
Valery has described the contradiction, the aporia at the heart of the museum
as an institution. Despite its pretensions to order and meaning the museum by
its nature is a chaotic institution, in which objects, taken from their original
and intended locations, vie for the visitor's attention.
[The museum's] project is doomed from the start because representation
within the concept of the museum is intrinsically impossible. The muse-
um can only display objects metonymically at least twice removed from
that which they are originally supposed to represent or signify. The
objects displayed as a series are of necessity only part of the totality to
which they originally belonged. Spatially and temporally detached from
their origin and function, they signify only by arbitrary and derived
associations. The series in which the individual pieces and fragments
are displayed is also arbitrary and incapable of investing the particular
object with anything but irrelevant fabulations.34
This view might seem to render the the concept of the museum redundant. Yet
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out of these 'ruins of the Museum' it may be possible to construct an effective
and questioning strategy for the representation of material culture. As we have
seen earlier in this chapter the Cubists attempted to develop a style of painting
adequate to problems of perception and relative points of view in a world
where the previously prevailing world-view had been shattered by changing
concepts in time, space and reality, and concomitant developments in philoso-
phy.35
 In developing analytic cubism, Braque and Picasso introduced into their
paintings the technique of collage, 'By most accounts.. .the single most revolu-
tionary formal innovation in artistic representation to occur in our century'36.
Collage is defined as the transfer of materials from one context to another, and
montage their dissemination of these borrowings through their new setting.
What these techniques enable is a form of representation adequate to the new
understandings of the world described earlier in the chapter. In place of the
unified, linear and harmonious vision of linear perspective is one that is frag-
mented and heterogeneous, one that does not attempt to mimetically repro-
duce the real. Such a form of representation is not just the solution to the tech-
nical problems of analytical cubism, but reflects broader problems of episte-
mology and representation that had been, as we saw above, discussed since
the early nineteenth century37.
Collage has been described as the predominant, all-pervasive device of 20th-
century arts38 . As a technique it was used by artistic movements from Cubism,
Futurism and Dada through to Fluxus, Minimalism and the New Object move-
ment39. Gregory Ulmer has examined how collage can be seen to inform work
in areas beyond that of the visual arts. He has pointed out the use of collage
by, among others, Roland Barthes, John Cage and Jacques Derridao.
An obvious place for the exploitation of such strategies and techniques is the
museum. As Valery, Donato and others point out museums are places where
incompatible objects are placed together to vie for attention. They are, albeit
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unintentionally, three dimensional collages. It is possibly for this reason that
museums were a source of fascination to Surrealists. Collage was central to
the Surrealists' strategy for disrupting the given order of things. They quoted
with approval the poet Lautreamont's famous definition of beauty as 'the
chance encounter on a dissecting table of a sewing machine and an umbrel-
la.'41
 Max Ernst defined collage as 'the coupling of two realities, irreconcilable
in appearance, upon a plane which apparently does not suit them.'42 The
Surrealists employed such techniques for a number of purposes, to 'disturb the
principle of identity', to disrupt the appearance and order of the world, and to
question the concept of authorship 43. These were part of a more general strate-
gy to 'attempt to blow up the autarkical sphere of art and to force a reconcilia-
tion of art and life'.
The anthropologist and cultural critic James Clifford describes surrealism as
'an aesthetic that values fragments, curious collections, unexpected juxtaposi-
tions...'45 . The kinds of 'curious collections' that the surrealist were particular-
ly fascinated by were anthropological and ethnographic. Clifford has traced
the relationship between the Surrealist movement and the development of
ethnography as a discipline in France in the first part of this century 46 . In par-
ticular he examines the development of the ethnographic museum out of the
work of surrealists and surrealist-influenced thinkers such as Michel Leiris,
George Bataille and others associated with the College de Sociologie v. The
thinking of early French ethnographers such as Marcel Mauss had close con-
nections with that of surrealist fellow travellers like Georges Bataille and
Michel Leiris. These close connections were pursued in collaborations between
Bataille and students of Mauss such as Alfred Metraux. It was in this fertile
environment that the moribund Trocadero museum, where Picasso had
viewed the African masks he used in Les Desmoiselles d'Avignon, was reorgan-
ised and, later, the Musee de l'Homme founded. The magazine Documents,
edited by Bataille, combined ethnographic and surrealist concerns. It applied
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surrealist techniques of juxtaposition and inventive recombination to images of
objects from different cultures in order to question and subvert the codes and
ideologies that underpin reality. Clifford describes the journal as 'a playful
museum that simultaneously collects and reclassifies its specimens.. .The jour-
nal's basic method is juxtaposition - fortuitous or ironic collage. The proper
arrangement of cultural symbols and artefacts is constantly placed in doubt."48
49
Strategies of collage, montage and juxtaposition have been found in work
done in museums and galleries. An example of such work is that undertaken
by Fred Wilson, an African-American artist who uses museum spaces and col-
lections to comment upon the difference between how Western and non-
Western objects are represented. In order to do so he takes objects out of their
normal settings within the museum and places them in situations in which
their meaning can be questioned 50 . An artist who has used similar techniques
to different ends is Joseph Kosuth, one of whose practices has been to curate
shows in which artifacts are juxtaposed in such a way as to foreground aspects
of their meaning that are normally concealed. Such was his 'The Play of the
Unmentionable' at the Brooklyn Museum, where works ranging from erotic
Japanese prints to salon nudes through to Larry Clark photos were placed
together, one of the intentions being to question the divide between erotic art
and pornography51 . There was also Eduardo Paolozzi's show 'Lost Magic
Kingdom' at the Museum of Mankind in London, which he juxtaposed objects
from its collection with his own works and objets trouve52. To this list we might
also add work by Peter Greenaway in various museums around Europe 53 ,
and installations by Marcel Broodthaers, whom we shall return to in the next
chapter54, the musees sentimen tales of Daniel Spoerri55, and the work of
Christian Boltanski56. Though the intentions of these shows were very differ-
ent, as indeed are the subject positions from which they operate, the strategies
they use can be seen to derive at least in part from Surrealism and ethnograph-
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ic Surrealism.
Whatever their individual intentions these exhibitions and events can be seen,
among other things, as a response to the problematic nature of the museum
and the kinds of classifications and representations it contains. Such events
have the potential to question and even subvert the systems of meaning and
categorisation which museums impose on their collections, and through
which, arguably, they play their part in maintaining the hegemony of the dom-
inant ideology. These are kinds of privileged interventions in which someone
outside the curatorial stockade is allowed to disrupt the order of objects in a
collection in order to erect, in the manner of the bricoleur, their own systems of
organisation.57.
Conclusion
The rational totalised space of Alberti and Descartes, that underpinned mod-
ern scientific rationality, and with it the museum, has been shattered. In its
place is a fragmented sense of space, sensitive to the multiplicity of alternative
perspectives, and to contradictions therein. This space has been manifested in
modes of representation from Cubist art, modernist fiction and film, and
through hypermedia and multimedia, in the computer. Though multimedia
has been used in the representation of museum collections, its potential to
come to terms with the contradictions and difficulties inherent in such institu-
tions has not been exploited. A possible strategy for enabling such exploitation
is through collage, montage and juxtaposition, especially as understood and
used by the Surrealists. Surrealism both took the museum as a focus of its cri-
tique of society, and influenced later generations of those working in the con-
text of the museum.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Surrealism and Digital Technology
In the last chapter I suggested that strategies used by the Surrealists might
prove useful for the representation of material culture on digital technology. It
is possible to argue, as Susan Sontag does writing.
 about photographyl, that
the influence of Surrealism has largely shaped our current modes of aesthetic
production and reception. Film, painting, advertising, television, photography
all show evidence of being influenced by Surrealism. For these reasons it is
perhaps not surprising that such an influence can be seen emerging recently in
digital technology. Indeed such technology might seem expressly designed to
facilitate the application of surrealist strategies of montage, collage and juxta-
position. This is because of one of the fundamental characteristics of the com-
puter, the fact that it is a digital machine. This means that it manipulates and
stores data in discrete elements. Thus any digital object, for example a word
processor file, a piece of digitally recorded music, or a digital image can be
edited and manipulated with extreme precision. Moreover any such object, or
part of an object can be copied and reproduced with no loss of quality, so
much so that it is impossible to determine which is the 'original' and which
the copy. Such capabilities make it extremely easy to combine or juxtapose dif-
ferent elements.
Since the computer's emergence in the nineteen eighties as a visual and textual
medium, rather than a' number cruncher', there have been many develop-
ments which exploit these capabilities. Word processing enabled a transforma-
tion in the way people thought about writing through simple capacities such
as copying, cutting and pasting text2. Somebody using a word processing
package can choose an amount of text of any length and either copy it, leaving
it where it is, or 'cut' it, taking it out of its present position, and 'paste' it else-
,
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where. Simple as these capabilities may seem they have had a profound effect
on how people write and indeed regard the process of writing 3. So called
'paint packages', software for the processing of digital images, enable design-
ers to manipulate and alter such images with enormous power and precision,
and to layer, merge or juxtapose different images seamlessly 4. Digital music
packages allow analogous operations to be performed on music. These various
developments have often had quite a profound effect on the media in which
they operate. Yet such abilities are still, in the main, understood and used as
tools to enable the production of finished artifacts. What I propose is that the
capacity of digital media to enable montage, collage and juxtaposition should
be exploited as an end in itself. This might manifest itself as software in which
users were enabled to make and display juxtapositions of different and dis-
parate objects, in order to explore the meanings thus engendered.
But in the representation of material culture such strategies run risks, especial-
ly in the context of mechanical reproduction. These are discussed by Douglas
Crimp writing about Malraux's 'Museum Without Walls' (figure 12), a concept
that would seem to anticipate the digital display of museum and gallery col-
lections. In his eponymous essay Andre Malraux finds in photography the
potential for a whole new approach to art and aesthetics. His eponymous
museum is, simply, the mass of photographic reproductions of works of art. It
would be able to obliterate distinctions of scale, to concentrate on details and
fragments, as well as to easily cut across the categories and distinctions
enshrined in the museum5. Malraux was, as Douglas Crimp puts it, 'enrap-
tured by the endless possibilities of his Museum, by the proliferation of dis-
courses it could set in motion, establishing ever new series of iconography and
style simply by reshuffling the photographs.'6
 Such a concept raises questions
of authority and meaning in the representation of material culture, which are
made more pressing by the capacity of digital media to manipulate data very
quickly, and thus to enable such 'reshuffling'.
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Figure 12. Andre Malraux and his Musie Imaginaire
Broodthaers's Museum
Any effective use of Surrealist techniques of montage and juxtaposition in dig-
ital media would need to be more critical acute and intellectually robust, oth-
erwise it runs the danger of becoming a playground for meaningless and sub-
jective juxtapositions. The beginnings of such an approach might be found in
the work of the Belgian artist and activist Marcel Broodthaers. Broodthaers
was interested in looking at museum practices, and how they connected to the
marketplace, partly by interrogating the museum's past. He exhibited a num-
ber of "museum fictions" from 1968, consisting of nonexhibitions, parodic
statements, and written statements. In doing so 'he exposed the ordering of
knowledge produced by museums as a strategy of power.' 8 He 'was particu-
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larly concerned with the way in which
museums institutionalize a discourse justify-
ing art's isolation from society'.9
One of his "museum fictions" was called the
'Musee d'Art Moderne, Section )(IX Siècle,
Departement des Aigles', of which one part Figure 13. A display from Broodthaers's
Eagle Museum
- the Section des Figures - was subtitled Der Adler vom Oligoziin his Heute ("The
Eagle from the Oligocene to the Present"). It was composed of 266 objects rep-
resenting eagles, borrowed from "real" museums and private collections,
including Broodthaers's own. It included a 'vast diversity of objects - from
paintings to comic strips, from fossils to typewriters, from ethnographic
objects to product logos'10. The juxtaposition of these elements, can, according
to Douglas Crimp, only seem "surreal". Thus, Crimp continues, 'The Section
des Figures demonstrates the oddness of the museum's order of knowledge by
presenting us with another "impossible" order.' 11 He quotes Foucault's
description of his inspiration for his book The Order of Things.
This book arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shat-
tered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought-
our thought. This passage quotes a 'certain Chinese encyclopedia" in
which it is written that "animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the
Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabu-
lous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) fren-
zied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (1) et
cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long
way off look like flies." In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing
we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is
demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the
limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.12
According to Crimp Broodthaers achieves a similar effect by alluding to the
Wunderkammer and Cabinets de Curiosites of the Renaissance and Baroque
period. Crimp points out that the...
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...Section des Figures does not, of course, return to the Wunderkammer.
But it does recollect the heterogenous profusion of its objects and the
museum's reclassification of them during the nineteenth century.13
Following Foucault he writes that 'the site that allows us to juxtapose het-
erogenous entities is that of discourse, and that discursive formations undergo
historical mutations of such magnitude to render them entirely incompatible
with each other.'14
The Irrational Cabinet
The magnitude of this incompatibility is evinced in the attitude of many writ-
ers of museum history to curiosity cabinets, which has often been either confu-
sion or contempt. They are described as, for example, the 'product of a satur-
nine disordered mind', or as 'unsystematic and idiosyncratic in composition'15.
Recent work, particularly by Hooper-Greenhill 16 and papers collected and
edited by Impey and McGregor 17, has been done to show that these curiosity,
or 'irrational' cabinets are not random collections of eccentric objects, but as
meaningfully structured and ordered as a modern museum, albeit in the con-
text of a different epistemological structure. In particular in her book Museums
and the Shaping of Knowledge Hooper-Greenhill does much to rescue cabinets
and wunderkammer from such treatment by showing their underlying rationali-
ty in the terms of their surrounding episteme. As Hooper-Greenhill points out
this rationality suggests an order of things that is profoundly other than that
which we understand.
... 'The confused and disordered' 'cabinets of curiosity' can be better
understood as 'cabinets of the world... The rationality that explains the
structure of knowledge that informed the 'cabinet of the world' can be
understood, at least in part, through a combination of several elements.
These include the epistemological practices of the Renaissance episteme
(interpretation, resemblance, esoteric knowledge); mnemonic techniques
(places and images); and models of the world presented through two-
dimensional (Fludd), and three-dimensional (Camillo) exemplars.18
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Figure 14. Worm's Museum; a typical cabinet of curiosities.
Despite Crimp's notion of the 'magnitude of incompatibility' between these
cabinets of curiosity and kunstkammer and the modern museum, they have
been of increasing interest to people working in or around museums recently.
They are often invoked by artists, such as Broodthaers and those mentioned in
the last chapter, Spoerri, Paolozzi, and Kosuth, to which list one might add
Joseph Cornell, Susan Hiller, and even Damian Hirst and his cabinets of shells.
Such a revival of interest would seem to accompany interests in the discursive
and rhetorical nature of museums, and the forces which underlie the orders of
knowledge they represent. Some go further. The cultural historian Stephen
Bann, writing about the rhetoric of display, acknowledges the cabinet as a
'highly relevant model' for the modern museum, sharing that institution's
'intimate concern with particulars-eccentric in its coverage and modest in
scale.' 19 . He takes for granted 'the relevance and interest of the cabinet of
curiosities for contemporary concepts of visual display'.20
Despite this interest such cabinets are as enmeshed in the discourses and
power structures of the premodern period as the museum is in those of the
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modern. To suggest them as a model for arranging and displaying objects for
contemporary purposes would seem still to be a permit for meaningless and
subjective juxtapositons. Broodthaers alludes to these institutions as a way of
shocking the viewer out of taking for granted the structures and taxonomies of
the modern museum. They can act for the viewer as Borges's encyclopdia
does for Foucault (and his readers). Broodthaers"museums'and the cabinets
they resemble do not, on the face of it, offer a coherent alternative for museum
practice.
What the cabinet of curiosities does offer is an understanding of the relation
between language and the world that differs from that manifested in the mod-
ern museum. This is exemplary of the epistemic structures of the Renaissance
and Baroque periods. They were concerned with what Foucault calls the dis-
course of resemblance. That is to say they were concerned with delineating
and representing the concept of the world as a display of connected and relat-
ed signs. Hooper-Greenhill writes that
During the Renaissance, writing was the privileged epistemological
structure. Objects had marks written upon them, signatures, messages,
that demanded reading and interpretation. Natural and artificial things
were thought of in much the same way as manuscripts and texts. An
accumulation of objects and an accumulation of texts signified in the
same way, and were displayed mixed together in the same spaces...
images carried the same messages as words, sometimes words were
used, sometimes pictures. In Giganti's 'museum' in Bologna, the objects
and texts together represented the unity of the world. In Imperato's
'museum' in Naples, what we would now call objects and what we
would now call books said the same thing: the stuffed and mounted
pelican told the same story as the words of Physiologus. 21
With the rupture between the Renaissance and Classical epistemes the manner
of understanding the world changes.
The activity of the mind...will no longer consist in drawing things
together. ..but, on the contrary, in discriminating, that is, in establishing
their identities, then the inevitability of the connections with all the suc-
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cessive degrees of a series.22
Thus the world is no longer conceived of as consisting of signs to be read, 'a
complex of kinships, resemblances, and affinities, and in which language and
things were endlessly interwoven', but of objects and phenomena to be
analysed and understood using a common unit or a position in an order. This
new understanding is reflected in the museum as it develops during the sev-
enteenth century, and into the eighteenth. The arrangements of objects,
described by some later historians as 'irrational', that characterise the curiosity
cabinets, is replaced by a 'rational' organisation, a taxonomy, reflecting the
mathematic, scientific understanding of the world.23
One result of this is that definite boundaries between disciplines are erected.
Another relates to the way that the understanding based on analysis and
mathesis occludes or denies the mediating effect of language. Thus objects in
the museum are no longer, as in the curiosity cabinet, explicitly metonymic of
the world outside. They are not signs to be read as rhetorical figures in a larger
text, but rather as objects whose meaning is sufficiently explicit in their materi-
al and historical reality. What matters in the museum is the physical presence,
the actuality, of the objects. An artifact such as Cassiano dal Pozzo's Paper
Museum, in which the objects are representations by artists on paper of objects
and phenomena, would not, in the modern sense, be a museum (except inas-
much as the representations in a reflexive move, themselves constitute muse-
um objects).
A Baroque Paradigm
The cabinets of curiosity are, at least in part, Baroque institutions. Though they
originated in the Renaissance, they 'prospered during the baroque period'24.
The French philosopher Christine Buci-Glucksmann has detected what she
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calls a 'baroque paradigm' 25 which 'asserts and establishes itself within
'modernity", and which she finds particularly evident in the works of Walter
Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire, Jacques Lacan and Roland Barthes26. As a style
the Baroque is according to Martin Jay, 'Sensitive to the interpenetration of the
discursive and the figural - for example, in richly decorated emblem books - it
registered an awareness of the impurities of both that was well in advance of
its time.'27
 Jay writes that...
...The rise of hermeneutics, the return of pragmatism, the profusion of
linguistically oriented structuralist and poststructuralist modes of
thought have all put the epistemological tradition derived from
Descartes very much on the defensive.28
He continues that 'if one had to single out the scopic regime that has finally
come into its own in our time, it would be the "madness of vision" Buci-
Glucksmann identifies with the baroque.' 29 According to Jay for Buci-
Glucksmann it is 'precisely the baroque's subversion of the dominant visual
order of scientific reason that makes it so attractive in our postmodern age.'30
This 'Baroque paradigm' can also, arguably be seen in the development of
computer applications such as multimedia and hypermedia.
The Baroque and Hypermedia
In the first two chapters of this thesis I examined some of the metaphors asso-
ciated with computers and multimedia. I suggested that the computer is
understood as a kind of interior space, not unlike a museum. I suggested that
this determined the kind of software developed, such as virtual reality and
artificial intelligence, which in turn impose ideologically determined visions of
the world on computer practice, that are intimately bound up with instrumen-
tal rationality. These expressed not just a modern sensibility, but a specific
early modern Cartesian vision of the world. They are bound up in the dis-
course of clarity, and transcendence that characterises Cartesian philosophy. It
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is paradigmatic of classical vision. As such it is also paradigmatic of the cer-
tainties of the scientific culture out of which it developed.
Hypermedia and multimedia on the other hand are, I suggest, expressive of
other ways of representing and understanding the world, ways that could be
characterised as Baroque. For example they invoke one of the most baroque of
motifs, the labyrinth. 31 By the very nature of their organisation
multimedia/hypermedia systems are labyrinthine. 32 In a hypermedia system
the user is confronted with screens which lead possibly to many other screens.
He or she is not given any sense of a coherent whole, nor of a structure which
could be made visible. Each view is opaque, concealing the multiple paths that
lead off it. There also is no illusion of depth in multimedia. Unlike in virtual
reality the screen does not pretend to be a window onto a three-dimensional
reality.33 Rather the language with which that reality has been described has
congealed, to reveal itself as the source of that reality. It makes us aware of
what Rudolf Gasche calls the 'tamn of the mirror'34, the materiality of the medi-
um of representation..35
Allegory
One of the main rhetorical tools through which the Baroque use of language
expressed the material of the medium of representation was allegory. Jonathan
Culler defines allegory as 'a form which demands commentary, goes some
way in providing its own.36' It is usually compared, often to its detriment, to
the symbol which is perceived of as 'an organic unity of or harmony seldom
found in the world: a fusion of the concrete and the abstract, of the appearance
and reality, of form and meaning.' Allegory on the other hand 'stresses the dif-
ference between levels, flaunts the gap we must leap to produce meaning, and
thus displays the activity of interpretation in all its conventionality.' 37 Allegory
is the trope through which Broodthaers's museum addresses the museum's
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occlusion of its rhetorical nature and the presentation of its classification as
'adequate to a nonlinguistic universe'. .
Because of the arbitrary selection of the exhibition's components, as
well their widely differing geographical and temporal origins, the indi-
vidual objects necessarily remain separate from one another. Whereas in
their original collections they may be thrown together solely on the
basis of being assigned the same classification according to the estab-
lished terms of cultural and intellectual history-which is how the art
museum functions-in Broodthaers's experiment they are withdrawn
from this system and, by virtue of their common subject matter, enter
into previously unknown combinations. The old order, the apparently
self-evident taxonomy of cultural Specimens, has been fractured. The
principle of classification that formerly contained them has been
exposed as fiction. Its place is taken - but undogmatically, merely as an
example, with no claims to permanence - by another equally fictional
order.. 38
If Broodthaers's museum is a fiction then it is an allegorical fiction. Buchloh
writes of Broodthaers's...
...versatility in imbuing visual signs with historical material concretions
and including their full range of their inherent dialectics (the contradic-
tions of the reality from which they arise as ideological meaning as well
as their own contradictory nature in shaping and determining that real-
ity and our reading of it... No sign seems to have the same meaning
twice, no semiological element is secured.39
Benjamin, Allegory and Surrealism
Broodthaers's use of allegory as a dialectical tool echoes much of the work of
the German critic, philosopher and essayist Walter Benjamin. Indeed such are
the similarities that both Crimp and Sherman have suggested that
Broodthaers's work realises many of Benjamin's ideas. Benjamin's work is a
point at which the Baroque, allegory and Surrealism all meet. In his first major
work, written for his habilitation,40 published in English as 'On the Origins of
the German Historical Drama'41 Benjamin attempted to rehabilitate allegory
against the claims of symbolism. He did this through a study of seventeenth-
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century German Baroque drama. According to Benjamin such dramas present
beauty as an illusion, life as full of vanity, worthless and bound towards decay
and death, which comes as a welcome release. To do this such works use not
symbolism, but allegory. In contrast to the symbol allegory does not exist in a
self-sufficient relation to the idea it seeks to represent, but needs completion
from an outside source, the allegorist. The meaning of the allegorical image is
not self sufficient, all meaning has ceased to be self evident. Benjamin made
explicit comparisons between the Baroque and elements of modern artistic
practice, in particular montage.
Benjamin saw affinity between the allegoric imagination of the German
baroque dramatists and the artistic needs of the twentieth century; first
in the melancholy spirit of the former, with its emblematic but
inscrutable insignia, which he rediscovered in Kafka; then in the cognate
principle of montage which he found in the work of Eisenstein and
BrechY.Montagebecame for him the modern, constructive, active
unmelancholy form of allegory, namely the ability to connect dissimilars
in such a way as to "shock people into new recognitions and under-
standings.42
Benjamin's theory of montage was further developed in the context of his
interest in the technology of mechanical reproduction and its relation to the
work of art. He examined this issue in several different works, most famously
in his essay 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' 43. Here
Benjamin discusses how photography, by enabling the mass reproduction of
works of art, deprives them of their 'aura', that is to say their ritual or cultic
function, and thus their 'customary historical role... in the cultural legitimation
of traditional social formations.'". As Benjamin says the 'The uniqueness of a
work of art is inseperable from its being embedded in the fabric of tradition'45.
Benjamin sees the capacity for the mechanical reproduction of images, as man-
ifested in photography and film, as potentially a force for liberation.
... mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art from its parasit-
ical dependence on ritual. To an ever greater degree the work of art
reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility. From
COct
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a photographic negative, for example, one can make any number of
prints; to ask for the "authentic" print makes no sense. But the instant
the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic produc-
tion, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritu-
al, it begins to be based on another practice-politics.46
Benjamin saw the potential for political use of mechanical reproduction in par-
ticular in film, of which he remarks that the...
... The spectator's process of association in view of these [moving] images
is indeed interrupted by their constant, sudden change. This constitutes
the shock effect of the film, which, like all shocks, should be cushioned
by heightened presence of mind.47
In film, according to Benjamin, the 'meaning of each single picture appears to
be prescribed by the sequence of all preceding ones, which is similar to the
way that in picture magazines 'captions have become obligatory. And it is
clear they have an altogether different character than the title of a painting.'48
In a similar vein Rosalind Krauss writes that 'The Photograph heralds a dis-
ruption in the autonomy oi sign. A mean-
inglessness surrounds it that can only be
fiSed hy the addition of a text.'49 Like the
object in the museum the photograph,
cliesp.ke is ()aims o represenY reabty, is
nothing but a fragment, a piece of bric-a-
brac, to which meaning can only adhere
through interpretation. With the addition of
a caption the photograph becomes like
another concern of Benjamin's, the Baroque
emblem, which Buck-Morss describes as 'a
montage of visual image and linguistic sign,
out of which is read, like a picture puzzle, Figure 15. A Baroque allegorical emblem,
form Cesare di Ripa's Iconologia
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what things "mean" 50 The emblem is an allegorical, as opposed to symbolic,
device.
It is with these elements that Benjamin approached the notions of montage
and juxtaposition proposed by the Surrealists. Benjamin takes the Surrealist
techniques, but eschews surrealism's descent into mystical transcendence.51
Margaret Cohen presents an image, drawn from Benjamin's letters, of
Benjamin as a Fortinbras who 'armed with the two-edged sword of dialectical
reason... enters into battle against surrealism's haunted Hamlet, lost in ghosts,
dreams and the seductions of aesthetic representation.' 52 In Benjamin's hands
montage becomes a didactic tool for political ends rather than an aesthetic
technique., which he employed in one of his main didactic tools, which he
called "Dialectical Images" or "Dialectics at a standstill". This was a technique
of taking elements of everyday life out of their normal contexts and rearrang-
ing them in new constellations, thereby divesting them of their familiarity and
stilling ints an active anci ctitical postute.53
Benjamin intends that this method should have an estranging or shocking
effect on objects: it should temporarily freeze them as slides under the micro-
scope of the critic, lift them momentarily from their natural environment in
order to make them relevant for the present. The principle of estrangement is
inherited from the Surrealist techniques of montage and juxtaposition. With
these "shocking "juxtaposition of everyday objects in Benjamin's 'Dialectics at
a Standstill', these objects come to demand a unique, critical consideration.54
Though he never wrote about museums in any detail, in various parts of his
oeuvre Benjamin does discuss collecting. He talks of the 'stupid and passive'
private collector for whom an object exists only as they own it and can exist as
capital. He also criticizes the public art collection, which he describes as 'less
objectionable socially and more useful academically' than private collections55.
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But these public collections, as represented by the museum, wrest...
...objects from their original historical contexts not as an act of political
commemoration, but in order to create the illusion of universal knowl-
edge. By displaying the products of particular histories in a reified his-
torical continuum, the museum fetishises them.. •56
In a note for his unfinished 'Arcades Project' 57
 Benjamin describes what he
sees as a positive kind of 'personal' collector, one who liberates things from the
bondage of utility, renders them useless so as to be able to unravel the secret
historical meaning of the things they accumulate 58. In the Arcades Project
Benjamin becomes this kind of collector59. Benjamin 'collects' the objects in the
Arcades Project not to possess them, nor to use them in the creation of an illu-
sion of historical knowledge but, as Adorn° describes it, to 'awaken congealed
life in petrified objects... but also to scrutinise living things so that they...
abruvtly release their significance.' 60 If Benjamin is understood as a collector,
and the Arcades Project not as notes for a book, but as a collection, then he is
his positive type of 'personal' collector. Benjamin treats the arcades themselves
as the site of a collection. 'One observes the Parisian arcades as if they were
possessions in the hand of a collector.'
It is possible to speculate that digital media may have offered Benjamin the
ideal site to undertake his kind of collecting. Gregory Ulmer observes that
'Walter Benjamin foresaw what a number of contemporary commentators have
suggested - that hypermedia does for scholarship what photography did for
portrait painting... [it] frees scholars from the labour of compilation and index-
ing - as painters were freed from the primary task of representing the visible
world - in order to invent new functions and styles for Discipline discourse'61.
He quotes Benjamin's observation that...
Today the book is already, as the present mode of scholarly production
demonstrates, an outdated mediation between two different filing sys-
tems. For everything that matters is to be found in the card box of the
researcher who wrote it, and the scholar studying it assimilates it into
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his own card index. 62
This statement could be seen to anticipate Vannevar Bush's Memex system
described in chapter three. Certainly like much of his work it bears a resem-
blance to ideas underlying hypermedia. It is Benjamin who remarks that
One of the foremost tasks of art has been the creation of a demand
which could be fully satisfied only later. The history of every art form
shows critical epochs in which a certain art form aspires to effects which
could be fully obtained only with a changed technical standard, that is
to say, in a new art form.63
Five years after Benjamin's suicide Vannevar Bush wrote 'As We May Think',
the paper which formed the basis of the development of hypermedia. Nearly
fifty years after his death hypermedia and multimedia are now available forms
of writing and representation. Much as Benjamin believed the work of Dada
artists anticipated in pictorial and literary means what was later properly
realised in film, so perhaps hypermedia and multimedia are the means to
realise Benjamin's ideas about collecting and representing material culture.
Conclusion
As we saw in the first chapter the computer is often characterised and under-
stood as a kind of space. I suggest that the cabinet of curiosities, the so-called
"irrational" cabinet is an appropriate model for that space than the traditional
museum in the representation of material culture. As such it can operate on
several levels;
• As a metonym of the idea of incompatible orders of knowledge, the
acknowledgment of which makes us aware of the discursive nature of the
museum;
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• As a model of a personal collecting space appropriate to the positive idea of
collector as expounded by Benjamin
• As a structure whose concern with signification is appropriate to a postmod-
ern concern with textuality and rhetoric.
The computer can become a space for a Modern 'emblematics', where elements
are juxtaposed in different configurations to engender new meanings. By com-
bining the power of digital technology with the surrealist and benjaminian
techniques of juxtaposition, montage and collage it will enable in a powerful
and accessible way the questioning and deconstruction of how we represent
object and material culture, whether in the context of museum and gallery col-
lections or outside their walls.
In the next chapter I describe the CABINET project which aims to realise the
ideas described in this chapter within the context of a piece of software
designed for the representation of material culture.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Theory into Practice
This chapter describes the practical part of the PhD. It also describes the rela-
tionship between the theoretical elements and this practical part. In the previ-
ous chapters I have attempted a critique of the museum and of digital technol-
ogy in relation to the surrounding epistemology and culture. The intention in
this critique has been to expose the ideology and the structures of thought
which determine how these institutions and apparatuses were and are devel-
oped, understood and used. In particular it has been concerned with how cul-
tural factors and models detemine how digital technology is used, and how
this is evinced in relation to the representation of material culture. It has also
been intended to enable an understanding of how they might be better used in
relation to each other.
This critique constituted an argument in its own right. But it has also been an
account of the thought processes underpinning the practical work. This is not
to suggest that I worked patiently through these theoretical ideas, and, when
satisfied, embarked on the work of design. The relationship between theo-
ryand practice is, as I stated in the introduction, a complex dialectic, and in
this case each was instrumental in the development of the other over the peri-
od of the PhD research. But the presentation of a clear narrative appropriate to
a PhD has necessitated this structure, in which accounts of the theoretical and
practical are separated, and in which the chronological relationship between
development of the theory and of the practical work is simplified.
Process of Design
To undertake the practical work necessitated the use of a practical skill, that of
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an interface designer. Interface design refers to the process of designing how
the computer and the user communicate with each other. It necessitates devis-
ing ways of bridging between the binary code of the computer and human
language. Interface design is a different process to other kinds of design.
Though it has elements of both it is neither graphic design, nor product
design. The nature of the computer is such that, within certain broad con-
straints, it is possible to enable it to do almost anything. The interface designer
does not have the constraints, nor the developed and defined forms and
guidelines that a graphic designer has when, for example, designing a book.
Nor are there the straightforward physical limitations and requirements expe-
rienced by the product designer. The interface designer is, in theory, presented
with an enormous amount of choice and freedom, with all the disadvantages
as well as advantages that that suggests. With this freedom comes the possibil-
ity of confusion and obscurity, which is compounded by the very different and
obscure nature of binary information and calculation. This is why metaphor is
useful for giving computer users a model from other media or the physical
world to help them in communicating with the computer.
In actuality the choice open to an interface designer is limited by the available
equipment and expectations. As noted earlier in this thesis for a number of
reasons the computer has been manifested as a certain shape, and a certain
configuration of devices, the monitor, box, keyboard and mouse, which sug-
gest an idea of interiority. Accompanying this, as noted earlier, is how software
and interface design also promote the idea of the computer as an interior
space. These facts determine how the computer is actually used. They impose
not only certain modes of action, but also certain metaphors on the design.1
As evinced in earlier parts of this thesis, this problematic and loaded notion of
an interior space has dictated my approach to the question of the digital repre-
sentation of material culture. Chapter two described how the idea of an interi-
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or and separate space is congruent with the notion of the museum, and how
this has cultural and epistmological ramifications. The next chapter described
alternatives to this structure found in recent art and philosophy, in particular
that of the Surrealists. In the fourth chapter these ideas were developed further
through the work of Walter Benjamin, Marcel Broodthaers and through their
use of allegory.
In particular this part of the thesis invoked the curiosity, or 'irrational' cabinet
that preceded the museum. In terms of the theoretical aspects of the thesis the
cabinet represented an alternative kind of space to the museum, where differ-
ent kinds of displays and structures could be erected. The cabinet, combined
with other elements, surrealist and other uses of juxtaposition and montage,
and renaissance and baroque 'emblematics', also offered a potential metaphor
for the design of the practical work. As a metaphor it made possible working
with ideas of spatiality without getting stuck with the problems and imposi-
tions of the museum as a space. With this in mind I intended that the practical
work should have the following characteristics.
• It should use to the full multimedia's capacity for complex arrangements of
information. In place of the museum or gallery's static, single, physically
determined arrangement, numerous, complex and multidimensional arrange-
ments should be possible.
• It should exploit the computer's ability to store, manipulate and sort com-
plex information very quickly to avoid instating the hierarchical relationship
between those disseminating information and those receiving it found in most
media and institutions such as the museum
• It should instead enable a user to have a much closer relationship with the
information by being able to make serendipitous discoveries, juxtapositions
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and to assemble and arrange material in different structures, thus giving her
the power to examine and deconstruct the various categories and taxonomies
with which we understand the order of things.
• The focus on the material object should be replaced by an understanding of
objects (or rather images of objects), texts, film and all other forms of represen-
tation as of equal weight. Thus such representation's nature as signification,
foregrounded by being in a digital form, can be acknowledged.
The VTC and Cabinet
The chance to realise these ideas came in the shape of the Virtual Teaching
Collection project at Cambridge University.2 The project's intention was to
design software for departments in which actual artifacts are used in teaching.
Departments have collections of such objects. In actual teaching collections as
they exist in universities and university museums objects are often fragile and
rare and access is normally limited to those researching, studying or teaching
in the institution in which the collection is housed. Furthermore the constitu-
tion of the collection is often subject to the vagaries of curator's and donor's
choice of objects and the limitations set upon availability of such objects,
through the institution's own financial constraints and the mechanics of the
marketplace. Like all museum collections teaching collections thus have many
shortcomings, anomalies and lacunae.
With the 'Virtual Teaching Collection' the project group at Cambridge hoped
to overcome at least some of the problems described above. By amalgamating
in digital form several different collections in the same subject area more bal-
anced and complete collections can be assembled. By placing such virtual col-
lections on easily transportable media such as CD-rom many more people can
have access to them. Obviously virtual collections do not offer the experience
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of being able to handle actual objects, but through rich visual archiving, three
dimensional imaging and so on such collections can stand as a useful substi-
tute when the real thing is not available, as well as offering access to larger sets
of objects than found in a single collection. The project's aim was to assemble
digital archive material, and to develop sophisticated tools with which to
view and manipulate the collections. I was invited to be the designer on the
project3.
The Structure
After a process of design, programming and discussion 4 the final structure of
the system was arrived at. It is divided into three parts
• The software in which the tools and viewing mechanisms are located;
• CABINET files, called 'collections', in which the information about and
pointers to the material are recorded;
• The mass of material itself, pictures, text files audio, animations etc... which
sit in separate folders.
There is a potential source of semantic confusion between the 'collections' and
the folders of material. It might at first seem more obvious to call the folders of
material 'collections'. It was that argued that, on the contrary, the 'collections'
were where the inchoate mass of material was given structure. Without this
structuring they were not in any sense collections, just groups of files.
Furthermore the user only had access to these groups of objects as CABINET
collections through the 'collection' files.
One of the main concerns was to offer alternatives to the normal hierarchies of
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user/reader and author. Any user of the system can in theory open an already
existing collection, start a new collection from scratch, edit, change or add to
an existing collection, use an existing collection as the basis of a new collection,
or combine elements of two or more collections together. In order to explain in
greater detail what CABINET enables a user to do it is best perhaps to go
through the various possibilities. In order to make a new collection the user
needs to assemble material into a folder on his or her computer. This material
can be pictures, in the form of Pict files5; Quicktime6 and QuicktimeVR files7;
audio files; text files, which themselves can contain pictures; in fact any non-
application-specific Macintosh filetype. It is also possible to include applica-
tion-specific files such as Director animations. CABINET itself cannot run
these files, but can open up the appropriate software to run them. If a user is
assembling a collection of, for example, archaeological remains their material
may consist of scans of photographs of the objects, Quicktime capture of video
of the sites where they were found, texts about the objects, QuicktimeVR three-
dimensional views of the objects, as well as Director interactive animations
explaining aspects of archaeology, or spreadsheets tabling archaeological data.
Having assembled some material the user opens CABINET, and imports it all
and thus creates a 'collection'. Next the user creates a database form by open-
ing the Database Editor. This is a tool with which the user can decide what
fields a database should comprise (figure 16). This entails giving each field a
name and deciding what kind of information it should be able to hold; short
text; long text; integer; decimal; date; list, in the case where there are limited
choices. Doing this creates a database form. Each object, of whatever sort in
the collection has this form automatically attached to it.
By opening a 'search window' the user can now look at all the objects on
palettes, page-like displays with grids of picons (picture icons, small representa-
tions of the object). These can be paged though by clicking on an arrow (figure
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also generates a list
of all the terms
under that field in
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which the user can
click to select. This
last capacity is
important in that it
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may select any
image, and view or
edit its attached
database form. Once
this is done the col-
lection is now ready
for the user to sort,
browse and make
specific searches
through and display
the results of these actions either as images or text records. 'Sorting' simply
sorts the order in which the collection is displayed alphabetically or numerical-
ly according to which database field is chosen. 'Searching' allows the user to
search by any database field (figure 18). Choosing to search by a field descrip-
tion brings up an appropriate tool or dialogue. For example searching in an
archaeological collection by date of accession will display a 'timeline', a visual
representation of the date range in question, with indications of when objects
were accessioned (figure 19). The user can drag across the timeline to select a
date range. Other searches will produce a dialogue box that will allow . the user
Figure 17. Cabinet's picon palette
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means the user does
not have to know
exactly what they
are looking for. The
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Figure 18. Cabinet's search box
complex combinatorial searches. The result
played in a search window as picons. Double-clicking on a picon will bring up
the full-sized version in a separate windows (figure 20). Within the limitations
of the software, RAM and screen space any number of images, texts or what-
ever can be displayed at once.
But the above, arguably, does no more than a standard visual database. There
are several capacities that make CABINET more than that. One is that as wel\
as sorting and searching the user can also link an object, 'hypermedia fashion',
with any other
object in the collec-
tion, or another col-
lection. This could
mean another object
in the database,
other views of the
same object, or to
texts (which might
or might not consti-
Figure 19. Cabinet's timeline
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'Edit Links' tool window. This attaches
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tute objects in them-
selves). In order to
make a link the user
finds and displays
the first object he or
she wishes to link,
brings up the 'Edit
Links' tool, finds the
picon of the second
object, and drags it
into an area on the
a link from the first object to the sec-
ond (figure 21). When displaying any object it is possible to bring up a win-
dow to show if there are any links from that object. These are displayed as
picons on that links window, which can be double-clicked to display the full
version. At the moment, as the software stands, it is not possible to construct
links from specific sections of a picture, though this is something that is
acknowledged as desirable. It is however possible to make hypertext links in
texts from single words, sentences, illustrations within the text and so on. This
is done in a manner similar to the above process. The user finds and displays
the text which they
wish to link from,
selects the specific
piece of text, a
word, the name of
an object, highlight
it, bring the 'Make
Hypertext Link'
tool, find the object
to be linked to and
Figure 21. Cabinet's Links Editor
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drag its picon into
the window on the
tool (figure 22).
Designing how
users make and fol-
low hyperlinks and
hypertexts made it
necessary to con-
front some problems
in the concept of
hypermedia and hypertext. Exploiting the computer's capacity for hypertextu-
al jumping between objects and information can lead to incoherence. In argu-
ments about hypertextuality the power of the computer is often set against the
constricting and archaic form of the book. A comparatively successful hyper-
text system, such as the Micro Gallery was designed as a series of flat linear
structures with simple jumps between them. This solution was arrived after
months of experimenting with structures of all sorts of different complexity
and shape (including three dimensional interfaces). 8 Within its limitations it
works. Another less successful example of hypertext is the hypertext version
of Jay Bolter's book Writing Space9. This piece of writing, which concerned the
future of text in a digital age, was produced simultaneously as a printed book
and an electronic hypertext. In comparison to the paper version, the hypertext,
which enables the reader to jump from topic to topic, is confusing and difficult
to read.
With these examples in mind the preferred solution for CABINET was that
each piece of text could be read from beginning to end, and would contain a
coherent argument. It will be possible to link to other narratives, and to see all
the narratives pertinent to, say, an individual object. Different narratives may
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disagree or conflict, and they would all be clearly authored and contingent.
The same narrative could be attached to different objects. The important point
was that each text was in itself a coherent whole. If the user chooses to read it
from beginning to end they will have read something that in itself makes
sense. They may choose to compare several such texts or jump between texts.
But, because the system uses windows, rather than being composed if flat
opaque, page-like screens, they will always be able to return to the first narra-
tive. Thus the use of a windows interface enables us to avoid a difficult aspect
of hyperlinking, especially in the case of text.
Another capacity that was thought desirable for CABINET to have was that
the user should be able to start a new collection and drag objects from any
other collection into it, or simply drag objects from one collection to another. In
a sense this was one of the most important parts of the software. Through such
an ability the user could become their own curator. This idea ran into prob-
lems which are indicative of difficulties, both practical and theoretical, in my
ideas for the projects. The question arose of whether, when the image of an
object was placed into another collection, the database information was placed
with it. If a new collection was being made entirely out of objects from one
larger collection, no problem arose. But if a collection was being assembled
from several different sources then the situation became difficult. If a collection
was comprised of objects described under different sets of database fields then
any kind of comprehensive searching and sorting became impossible. The
problem was that the ability of the user to assemble collections from disparate
sources was an important part of the underlying concept. The eventual solu-
tion was that, where possible, database fields in different collections should be
treated as similar enough to be amalgamated into a new database set. For
example fields such as date, location, size and so on, were transportable across
collections. Though this does not address the problem entirely, it does go some
way to finding a solution.
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As well as searching, sorting, linking and making new collections, users are
enabled to produce different kinds of materials for teaching and research. At
its most simple this meant that any text or image could be copied and pasted
into a word-processing file or a multimedia production. Collections of objects
could be assembled to make an onscreen 'slide show'. Though the equipment
is obviously cumbersome in comparison to actual slide projectors, the poten-
tial benefits of using computer-generated 'slide shows' are, in theory, great.
Any lecturer who has used slides will know the difficulties of assembling and
giving a slide lecture. Using a system such as CABINET makes finding the
appropriate images easy compared to searching through drawers of slides. In a
networked institution these could be sent rapidly and easily to the lecture
room, rather than transported in a slide carousel. And there can be benefits in
the lecture room itself. Though the lecturer could devise an order, he or she
would not have to adhere to it. If a question concerning an object or image that
had been shown previously arose, rather than reversing the carousel back to
the slide in question, the lecturer could simply jump to it. Several images
could be shown at once, to enable comparisons. If an object or image is dis-
cussed which is not part of the original slide show, the lecturer could use the
network to find it.
Some ideas turned out not to be realisable. One was to allow users to produce
what we called 'Exhibitions'. These would be displays of material from collec-
tions, which can be arranged on screen, in a manner analogous to designing a
gallery display. Exhibitions were intended as Cabinet's own unique kind of out-
put. The idea of Exhibitions had to be abandoned because of a lack of time, the
difficulty in envisaging exactly how they would look and work and the prob-
lems of programming such an idea. Another unrealised idea was called 'clus-
ters and constellations'. These would be more meaningful ways of displaying
links. The idea was to have palettes showing the relationship between a cen-
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tral, solar object and a constellation of objects around it. To a certain extent this
constituted a solution to some problems of spatial representation. Rather than
placing all objects in a three-dimensional space each is placed in a kind of
microspace, centred on the 'solar' object. It was intended that some gesture
made on a constellation object, a single mouse click for example, would make
that the solar object, and display an appropriate constellation. Thus one could
move through a collection of objects in a complex but readable and graphically
coherent space. For various, practical, reasons this did not get into the final
software. Despite this it is a possible solution to some aspects of the spatial
display of knowledge structures and relationships, one that might preserve the
complexity of those relations, without necessarily becoming incomprehensible.
CABINET and cabinets; practice and theory
CABINET was intended to do two things. One was to do what was required
for the Virtual Teaching Project. The other was to address the issues raised in
the previous chapters of this thesis. The important question here is to what
extent CABINET tries to undertake the latter, and to what extent it succeeds.
Clearly the name chosen for the software deliberately alludes to the curiosity
cabinets described in the last chapter. The term 'irrational cabinet' was coopted
from the work of Hooper-Greenhill to describe a way of collecting and struc-
turing material that differs fundamentally from that of the classical and mod-
ern museums. Thus it is metonymic of other ways of thinking, that might seem
irrational to us. As such it has the potential power to shock us out of the sense
of naturalness adhering to our own taxonomies and museum structures. Also
as a rhetorical or textual space it had an appropriateness for an era in which
rhetoric has again become understood as central to epistemology. This rhetori-
cality and textuality is also appropriate as a model for collections entirely com-
posed of representations. The representations of objects on screen are not the
objects themselves, nor even adequate as representations in themselves. They
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are signs referring to the object. Their status as signs becomes apparent when
accompanied, emblem-like, by captions, and textual exegeses. This under-
standing of the emblem also invokes its understanding by Benjamin as a kind
of proto-montage, and its part in his conception of the dialectical image.
With the design of CABINET it was possible to realise some of these ideas.
One of the crucial debates in the project was about the status of various kinds
of representation. Would there be any kind of hierarchy of representations,
with perhaps a particular view of an object having primacy, being in a sense
the object, and other views, and other ways of viewing, such as QuicktimeVR
3D views, being secondary? Were written texts to be secondary sources lacking
the privilege of visual representations? In the end it was decided that the rep-
resentations themselves were the ob*cts in the ic.ollectims', and ally kind. (If
representation had equal claim to be considered an object. This made CABI-
NET a very different kind of space to a real museum. Rather than trying to
reproduce in any way the idea of focussing on actual objects, supported and
explained by texts and other material, CABINET acknowledges the textuality
and rhetoricality inherent in digital media (indeed in all media, and in a fou-
cauldian sense, all human discourse). Whether photographs, diagrams, written
texts, animations or whatever, all the representations are texts to be read as
such. This also opened out the kinds of contents CABINET might display
beyond the concentration on the static material object of the museum, to mov-
ing images, sounds or indeed anything that can be digitised. Thus CABINET
can be compared not so much to a museum, but more perhaps to the rhetorical
spaces of the cabinets of curiosities.
One of the aims in CABINET was to erode the traditional author/reader hier-
archies. Users can be authors or readers or both simultaneously. They have the
power to assemble, categorise, link and structure collections themselves, either
from scratch or from other collections. Here the original cabinet of curiosities
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makes a good model as a space assembled by an individual, with possible
idiosyncratic purposes, as opposed to the authoritarian institution of the muse-
um, or the closed and authored system of the book, whose form is reproduced
in commercial CDRoms. Perhaps most important was the ability to link and
juxtapose elements. This enables CABINET to become a vehicle for the strate-
gies of montage and emblematics. A user can link a text to a picture, or indeed
any number of texts to one picture, thus; for example allowing a number of
different meanings to be potentially attached to that representation. Similarly
two (or more) pictures can be linked so that from their juxtaposition new
meanings might be inferred. The intended model of use is of groups of sepa-
rate images juxtaposed with texts which comment upon, and set themselves
up in a dialectical relationship with the images. These combinations of images
and texts themselves can act in a dialectical relationship with other groups of
image and text. The total meaning of such a system of images and texts would
lie not in a linear or totalised argument, as in a book, but in the dialectical rela-
tionship between all the elements.
Conclusion
There are clearly problems with CABINET. It has raised issues for which it has
not found an adequate answer. In a sense this is the point of combining prac-
tice with theory; to find such problems, and to confront them. There is for
instance the difficult question of authority. If you set up a system of knowl-
edge to which anyone can contribute or alter, who or what legitimates that
knowledge?. The immediate practical answer lies not in CABINET itself but
how institutions determine use and access. This does not however address the
broader issues. The need to do so becomes more pressing, especially as elec-
tronic media with its deconstruction of traditional hierarchies of information
production and consumption, becomes more widespread. There are other
problems, of design for example. In particular the difficulty of representing
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complex relationships between objects without sacrificing clarity. Despite these
misgivings I believe CABINET offers possibilities in the representation of
material culture not found in other media, or in other uses of digital media in
this area. To quote Hans Haacke's phrase, the computer, like the museum, is a
powerful 'means for the production of consciousness'. As he also remarks 'The
sophistication required to promote a particular interpretation of the world is
potentially also available to question that interpretation and to offer other ver-
sions.' It is through endeavours such as CABINET perhaps that such question-
ing and offering of alternatives can take place.
Notes
1 This problem also arises in relation to the design of software. For reasons also discussed in chapter two
the imposition of metaphors is both necessary and ubiquitous in such design. It pervades every aspect
and cannot be avoided. Yet again what I consider important is to remember that certain metaphors are
being imposed. A problem with designing for interactive multimedia is that the tools available to non-
programmers impose, sometimes insidiously, limiting metaphors of action. A good example is the
'industry standard' multimedia design tool Macromind Director. It was originally intended to enable
people to produce digital video. Its capacity to produce interactive works was added later. But its basic
interface remained, and indeed remains, that of a tool for producing linear narratives. A similar, though
different, problem is found with HyperCard, a tool produced by Apple computers for, among other aims,
enabling users to build simply and quickly interactive programs. Its basic metaphor is that of the 3" x 5"
rolodex card, upon which another metaphor, of the electronic button, has been imposed. In both these
cases not only do these metaphors impose practical limitations on what a user can do with the software,
but also often limitations on what they can imagine can be done with it. One area where this is obvious is
in degree shows for interactive media design courses in art schools, where for various reasons, facility of
use, support for colour and so on, Director is the software of choice. This leads to shows in which the
work is all alike, and all clearly the result of using Director.
2 For a description of this project see appendix 1
3 The designer's role in such a project can be divided, roughly, into four parts. One, as I have intimated
above, is to devise and appropriate a conceit or metaphor upon which to base the design. The second
and third parts, which are closely connected to the first as well as to each other, are to design the struc-
hire and the interaction. The structure can be characterised as a mapping of all the separate parts and
how they are connected. The interaction refers to how users get from one part to another, what links
there are between separate parts, and how users get back and how to stop them feeling lost, and what
tools the user might have access to and how they might use them. The last part is the actual look, which
is closely connected to the first part, and is concerned with colours, fonts, font sizes, and screen grids and
templates. It does not in this case involve programming, or the supply of content.
4 Described in appendix 1
5 A Pict file is a standard still digital image format used on Macintosh computers
6 A QuickTime file is a standard format used on Macintosh computers for storing moving images
7 A QuickTimeVR stores three-dimensional photographic images on Macintosh computers
8 Information gained through conversations with Alex Morrison, head of the company responsible for
the Micro Gallery software, and Neil Aberdeen, designer on the project
9 Bolter, 1991
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CONCLUSION
In some senses it is paradoxical to talk about conclusions in relation to a field
such as multimedia. It is a consequence of examining a new technology that
things often change faster than they can be written about. The term 'conclu-
sion' suggests ideas of closure and finality that are simply not relevant. In def-
erence to tradition I shall call this final section a conclusion, though it is more
of an indication of possible future developments, a crossroads rather than a
terminus.
At this particular moment there is a definite sense of being at a crossroads as
far as digital technology and the representation of material culture is con-
cerned. In the summer of 1996 the government announced its intention to
develop a strategy for use of information technology in museums into the next
century and beyond. Such a move offers the possibility of progressive and rad-
ical developments, though there is no guarantee that either this, or any possi-
ble future government would interested in such. This is not least a matter of
hegemony, in the sense defined by Gramscil . Museums are one of the institu-
tions through which those in power promote and further their interests, by
promoting a certain view of the world.2 I suspect that if they understand this
no government, conservative or otherwise, is going to fund technology which
threatens the operation of this hegemony, (though such a prediction runs the
risk of being a hostage to fortune). Nor is it to be supposed that museums
would wish to relinquish their position of authority and power. Yet digital
technology present a serious potential challenge to how information is struc-
tured and disseminated and therefore to the maintainance of hegemony by
those in power.
Yet there are possibilities and developments which might exceed the control of
the government and institutions like the museum, and enable the promotion of
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alternative and dissenting voices. A previous government-sponsored project,
the Internet, designed originally to enable communication between govern-
ment offices, companies and universities even after a nuclear strike, has
become possibly the most important and powerful source of free speech
extant. This is even more surprising considering that it was originally devel-
oped by the American Defense Department. Indeed it is the area of networked
communications that such might enable a liberating and empowering use of
digital technology.
These developments suggest the possibility of change in our relationship with
digital media as fundamental as that accompanying the rise of the personal
computer. The PC suggested ideas of possession and spatiality. Applications
and files were objects sitting in an enclosed space, which belonged to the PC
user. It was, I suggest, this spatiality and enclosure that determined how mul-
timedia was used and understood. Accordingly the multimedia industry at
first concentrated largely on CDRom and other closed, portable media. This
context informed both the theory and the practice. Since the industry was still
concentrating on the idea of delivering these closed objects to other more or
less closed objects, personal computers, the sense of enclosure and seperated-
ness was strong. It was this sense that made the argument comparing comput-
ers and multimedia to the enclosed space of the museum possible.
Network-based computing suggests the beginnings of another paradigm, one
that dissolved the distinction between inner and outer. Though it is true that
when exploring the World Wide Web through Netscape, or another browser,
one is encouraged to think that one is 'visiting' 'sites', but with this there is a
sense that one's computer has become porous. The private realm of the com-
puter and the public realm of cyberspace become intermingled. In the vision of
the network computer proposed by Larry Ellison at Oracle3 the notion of the
interior and exterior are removed altogether. The user will not own software
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but access it through phonelines. Files he or she are working on, or have fin-
ished, will exist in effect only in cyberspace, to be accessed on-line.
It is possible that Ellison's vision might not translate into commercial reality, or
that the Internet will not encroach further than it presently does on how we
understand and use the computer. But it is also possible that these develop-
ments will have profound effects not just on how we use computers, but also
on how we structure and understand knowledge. Though it is hard to predict
how this could manifest itself, I suggest that some of the ideas outlined in the
previous chapter might act as pointers to possible courses of action. Though
this thesis was written and CABINET developed with more or less closed
media in mind, I believe they are applicable to new developments in network
computing. Indeed it is only with the widespread use of networks in museum
contexts that some of the ideas in this thesis can be properly realised. In partic-
ular I suggest that CABINET could be scaled and adapted to work on the
Internet.
Indeed it is possible to imagine a CABINET-style piece of software to enable,
for example, all museums in the UK to be networked to allow schools, univer-
sities, researchers, members of the public, private users and so on access to a
vast virtual collection, which they can explore in a variety of different ways.
This would allow museums to place their records at the public's disposal, as
well as relevant documents, interactive displays etc... all as objects in this vir-
tual collection, and perhaps to link different objects, either in their collection or
to those in other collections. It could give users access to the records, allow
them to search using any relevant parameters and to make complex concate-
nated searches. It could also allow users to follow links through collections
and from collection to collection and to assemble virtual collections of their
own making. As well as these museums could make available virtual and
interactive exhibitions/displays, pedagogical games and other forms of educa-
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tive entertainment, and resource for multimedia and other developments, tele-
vision, education etc...
Such a project would possibly be a valuable tool for museums and their audi-
ences. But, more than that, it might be a way of changing how we look at
objects and museums entirely. As already stated this thesis started with the
idea that museums and computers are both spaces, separate from the world
around them. Like objects in museums representations of objects on CDRoms
and information displays and even on the World Wide Web can be 'visited' but
they remain within their own museum walls. Pursuing this metaphor suggests
that networks, if properly used can begin to dismantle these museum walls,
and carry the objects within out into the streets. There, liberated from these
confines, new uses can be found for these objects, and from them new truths
can be divined.
Notes
1 Grarnsci (1971) pp 181 - 2
2 For an account of the relationship between museums, hegemony and the present conservative govern-
ment see Jon Bird's essay in Block on Hegemony and Art History, collected in Robertson et al, 1996
3 Ellison believes that the desktop computer is going soon to be redundant to be replaced by a network
of machines, in which data is stored remotely and users log on to work, whether from home or the
office. See Wired Magazine, September 1996, p 44
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APPENDIX ONE
The Virtual Teaching Collection Project
In 1993 the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) invited
bids from consortia of Universities to propose projects for developing informa-
tion technology applications for education, to be funded by their 'Teaching
and Learning in Technology Programme' (TLTP). At Cambridge University
researchers and lecturers from the departments of archaeology and the history
of science had come together to propose such project and gather together suit-
able participants. In order to make the bid the Cambridge group assembled a
consortium of members from departments with appropriate collections in uni-
versities around Britain. These including the Universities of Oxford, Glasgow
and London. The Centre for Electronic Arts at Middlesex University was asked
to join the consortium to provide graphic and interaction design. As a member
of that department researching the idea of the virtual museum, and holding
similar ideas to those of the originators of the project I was invited to become
the designer. I accepted, seeing that the intentions of the project were close to
my own ideas about how such technology should be used in relation to the
representation of material culture. I felt that I could both satisfy the require-
ments of the project and realise my own ideas. The consortium were successful
in their application for TLTP funding, and a team was assembled to undertake
the work. This consisted of a programmer, Dr Lester Thomas; a researcher
from each of the two subject areas, Dr Sam Lucy for archaeology, and Dr
Michael Wintroub for the History of Science; myself as designer; and Dr Robin
Boast as coordinator. There was also a board of directors comprised of the vari-
ous researchers and teachers involved in assembling the bid as well as repre-
sentatives from the different institutions involved. Its capacity was mainly
administrative and advisory and the core team was given a high degree of
autonomy.
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Technical Decisions
The platform, the kind of computer we were going to use, had already been
chosen by the time I started work on the project. Luckily the platform of choice
was the Apple Macintosh, which was not only the make of computer with
which I was familiar as a designer, but also, in my opinion, the best and most
appropriate for the work in question. Macintosh computers have been, and
still are the machine of choice for those working in graphic design and multi-
media. Most of the tools used in such areas had originated on the Macintosh.
Apple had also devoted a lot of effort to making the hardware suitable for
visual, graphic and typographical work. To program Lester Thomas used an
application for software developers called Metroworks CodeWarrior. This, in
essence, is a package that enables a programmer to write routines in C++, a
popular and flexible programming language, for the Apple Macintosh
Computer. It encompassed routines to enable the business of working within
the constraints of the Apple Graphical User Interface easier.
Design Process
We quickly developed a modus operandi. I devised ideas about how the soft-
ware should look, and how a user would interact with it, on paper. I then
made an interactive mockup or storyboard on the computer, using Macromind
Director, a software package designed to enable nonprogrammers to make
interactive displays. We would then have a meeting of the team, possibly with
some of the directors, in which we would discuss the ideas I had proposed.
The programmer would suggest if they were feasible or not. The researchers
would discuss if they met their particular needs and desires. Criticisms of and
suggestion about the ideas were presented, and other ideas were put forward.
If everybody was broadly happy the programmer would set about program-
ming the ideas. When he had finished we would look at his work and see how
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my ideas worked in actuality. We would then discuss changes and what peo-
ple might want, and the process would start again. The design process led to a
number of iterations of the design of each part element of the software, which,
in turn, led to a number of iterations of the software. Though it went through a
number of changes, as can be seen from the progress of design the basic ele-
ments remained more or less the same throughout.
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APPENDIX TWO
Definitions of Modernity and Postmodernity
Since one of the main concerns of the thesis is the relationship between moder-
nity and postmodernity it is necessary to define what I mean by these terms.
The term 'modernity' is subject to a number of definitionsi- Apart from its use
simply to suggest what is happening now as opposed to what happened
before, the term modern has been defined in a number of ways and for a num-
ber of contexts and applied to a number of different specific historical
periods2. The philosopher Peter Osborne notes five distinct stages in the devel-
opment of the idea and its application, ranging from the twelfth century to the
period after the first world war3. A simpler way of understanding the term, at
least in chronological terms, might be to posit a period of early modernity
from the 15th century to the mid-17th century and a period of 'classic' moder-
nity from the mid-17th century to approximately 195O.
Within the context of this definition Susan Pearce has described modernity as a
'complex bundle of modes of thinking and acting', concerned with the devel-
opment of metanarratives, overarching discourses through which objective
realities and eternal truths could be defined and expressed5 . Modernity is
underpinned by the belief that there is an objective reality to which humans
have access, and that humans can transcendently observe and understand that
reality. This gives rise to the discourse of scientific knowledge and understand-
ing through which objective realities and truths can be defined and expressed,
and the idea that language is a mirror of objective. reality and can express that
reality without mediation or distortion. It also holds to a Judeao-Christian per-
ception of time as linear rather than cyclical, and the notion of historical and
human progress towards perfectibility, and technological mastery6.
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Such a definition suggests a view of history in terms of periodisation, as
opposed to linear progress. A useful concept in this area is that of the episteme,
the unconscious, but positive and productive set of relations within which
knowledge is produced and rationality defined 7. Specific epistemes can be
defined by the observation of large scale congruence of intellectual activity in
certain periods. Foucault discusses three specific epistemes, the 'Renaissance',
approximately the sixteenth century, the 'Classical', from the mid-seventeenth
to the end of the eighteenth century and the 'Modern', from the beginning of
the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. The shift from one episteme to
another, according to Foucault, is characterised by an immense cultural and
epistemological upheaval.8
Both the museum and the computer are seen as paradigmatic products of
modernity. Museums are 'a typical part of modern European cultural expres-
sion'9 . They are unique in holding the actual objects, the 'true data... upon
which... the materialistic meta-narratives [of modernity] depended for their
verification' 10. This is linked to the 'ability to display, to demonstrate, to show
the nature of the world, and of man within it by arranging the collected mater-
ial in particular patterns which reflect, confirm and project the contemporary
world view' 11 • The computer is also characteristic of modernity. As a Machine
dedicated to the representation of information through symbolic logic it exem-
plifies the notion of reason as mathesis12. This idea, of dealing 'with the 'for-
eign' matter of reality by translating into reason's own terms' 13 starts with
Descartes and continues through the Enlightenment14 .
One of the contentions of this dissertation is that both the museum and the
computer, as well as being paradigmatic of modernity, are involved in, and in
the case of the computer possibly instrumental to, a shift away from that
modernity, to new ways of acting and thinking, a new episteme, which at the
moment is subsumed under the title postmodern. The use of the latter term
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especially is contentious, and the view of history and culture it portends is by
no means universally agreed upon. It can either be understood as the latest
manifestation of modernity, or as a more profound change to a new kind of
society, and a new kind of thinking, the nature of which we cannot predict.
Many commentators have discussed postmodernity, and attempted to define
it. Among the most notable of these are Jameson (1991) and Lyotard (1979).
Jameson describes postmodernity as 'the cultural logic of late capitalism' in
which the production of culture has been integrated into commodity produc-
tion generally in order to satisfy an ever spiralling need for novelty and excite-
ment15 ; Lyotard studies the end of the hegemony of the metanarratives that
have legitimised the ideology of modernity. In each of these cases, and in the
case of other writers, the definitions may differ, but the sense of uncertainty
and fragmentation is shared. The kinds of beliefs and understandings that sus-
tained the hegemony of modernity, and concealed its discursive status, no
longer seem supportable. The concept of postmodernism is important because,
however ambiguous it is and however much debate it attracts, it is the rubric
under which much discussion of both the computer and the museum present-
ly takes place.16
Notes
1 The term itself derives from the Latin term modernus, which it turn derives from the word modo, mean-
ing recently. According to the philosopher Peter Osborne it is 'best understood as a structure of historical
time consciousness', one associated with 'the ideas of innovation, progress and fashion and counterposed to
the ideas of antiquity, the classical and TRADITION' (Peter Osborne, definitiion for forthcoming dictio-
nary of modern philosophy).
2 Habermas, 1989
3 Osborne, 1996
4 Pearce, 1992, p 2
5 Pearce, 1992, p 2
6 Pearce, 1992, p 3
7 This term was defined by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things (Foucault, 1970)
8 Foucault 1972. It must be pointed out that Foucault's definitions refer to France specifically. While fol-
lowing Foucault's notion of the episteme, and of epistemic rupture, I tend to subsume his classical and
modern periods into a general period of modemity, following Pearce's definition above.
9 Pearce, 1992, p 2
10 Pearce, 1992, p4
11 Pearce, 1992, p 4
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12 The concept of mathesis, which I shall deal with in greater detail in a later chapter, means a mental
discipline based on mathematics.
13 Docherty, 1993, p6
14 Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979, pp 6-7
15 Jameson, 1991
16 Coyne (1995) has examined the design of computer systems in the light of postmodern thinking.
Landow (1993) has looked at the relation between poststructuralist critical theory and hypertext. Poster
(1989, 1995) has discussed the capabilities of digital technology in terms of various strands of postmod-
ern theory. Turkle (1995) has examined the the kinds of decentered subjectivities enabled and encouraged
by the internet. Plant (in Robertson et al, 1996) compares the structures of learning and education
enabled by hypermedia and the internet to the 'rhizomatics' of Deleuze and Guattari.
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